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Within the complicated landscape of the effort to identify, explain,
and prevent wrongful convictions, an interesting type of proceeding
has begun to emerge. Posthumous exonerations, which declare an
individual innocent following his' death, have been seldom discussed,
but they can serve an important role in the innocence movement. The
exoneration of a deceased defendant may appear, at first glance, to be
a mostly empty gesture, which may explain the lack of attention
devoted to this proceeding to date. The posthumous exoneration has
an essential corrective justice function,2 however, for individuals,
communities, and societies. At the individual level, posthumous
exonerations, which are generally based on DNA evidence or
similarly definitive proof of innocence, ensure belated justice. From
a systemic perspective, they offer a greater opportunity to reveal
the causes of wrongful convictions than do the currently available
proceedings to exonerate live defendants. In so doing, they provide
valuable data for the reform of the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases. In a world in which the credibility of the criminal
justice system and its safeguards is questioned with each new addition
to the list of wrongful convictions,3 this function is essential.
t B.A., Yale (2003); J.D., Yale Law School (2007), Assistant Professor, University of
Tulsa College of Law. The author wishes to thank Professors Jordan Steiker, Brandon Garrett,
and Daniel Medwed for their comments on this piece.
I This Article will follow Samuel Gross's convention of using the male pronoun when
referring to exonerated defendants because men comprise approximately 96% of the total
exonerations. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through
2003, 95 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 n.2 (2005).
2 See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 97 GEO. L.J. 1509, 1532-33 (2009) (discussing constitutional remedies that "have
traditionally sought to repair the impact of the violation"-a "form of 'corrective justice"' that
has also "played a central role in private law").
3 See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Framing Wrongfal Convictions, 2008 UTAH L. REv. 5, 12
(describing the innocence movement as evoking public concern over "our fallible [criminal
justice] system").
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The systemic benefits of posthumous exonerations are twofold.
First, on a practical level, cases in which the innocence of a defendant
can be scientifically proven after conviction are rare; to date, they
have been largely limited to convictions obtained prior to 1989,4
for which biological evidence continues to be available for DNA
testing. Because of the importance of the data and the small size of
the potential data set, identifying and investigating each wrongful
conviction is critical, regardless of whether the wrongfully convicted
defendant is alive or dead. Secondly, because of the unique
considerations involved in posthumous exonerations, they present an
unusual opportunity for an examination of the problems that led to the
defendant's wrongful conviction. Because it is too late to free the
innocent defendant, the families and attorneys who bring posthumous
innocence claims are likely to turn instead to the question of how the
convictions were obtained-and the judges who hear such cases are
more likely to provide the answers. This was demonstrated in a 2009
Texas case, when a county district judge, while exonerating Timothy
Cole ten years after his death, conducted a searching inquiry into the
causes of his conviction. In its opinion, the court described the entire
course of evidentiary and investigatory missteps and provided
recommendations to the legislature for reform.6
The posthumous exoneration of Timothy Cole-and the four
others that have occurred since DNA testing was first used to prove
post-conviction innocence-represent an important extension of the
innocence movement and demonstrate that actual innocence
proceedings of all types could be used, not only to exonerate
individual defendants, but also to illuminate the causes of wrongful
convictions.
Since the first post-conviction DNA exoneration of an innocent
criminal defendant in 1989,7 the legal literature has closely followed
the more than two hundred convicted defendants who have proven
4 1989 typically marks the beginning of the "DNA revolution." See, e.g., Talia Fisher &
Issachar Rosen-Zvi, The Confessional Penalty, 30 CARDozo L. REv. 871, 872, 876 (2008)
(describing the "DNA revolution of the early 1990s" and documenting DNA-based exonerations
that occurred between 1989 and 2003); see also Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid
Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REv. 1, 4 (2009) (describing
the first DNA exoneration in 1989).
5 See In re A Court of Inquiry, No. D1-DC 08-100-051 (299th Dist. Ct., Travis County,
Tex. Apr. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Cole Decision], available at http://ipoftexas.org/wordpress/
wp-content/uploads/2009/05/cole-opinion-040720091.pdf.
6 Id. at 10-15.
7 See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 4, at 4. The first post-conviction DNA exoneration
occurred in 1989, when DNA tests proved that Gary Dotson, convicted of rape in Indiana in
1979, was innocent. Id.
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their innocence through this new technology.8 Although innocence
claims were made prior to the DNA revolution,9 their importance and
numbers have swelled with the help of science, as DNA can offer-
unlike the recanting of a jailhouse snitch or another individual's
post-trial confession to the crime-conclusive evidence of actual
innocence: "DNA evidence is 'uniquely probative' and 'timeless' if
preserved and tested properly."' 0 This certainty makes DNA
exonerations extremely useful in the study of the causes of wrongful
convictions." The means of achieving post-conviction justice through
the use of this evidence, however, have been as varied as the cases
themselves.
A diverse array of parties have initiated efforts to exonerate
innocent defendants, from the defendants themselves (in living
exoneration cases) to family members,12  innocence projects,13
religious groups,14  the media,' 5  and even representatives of
foreign governments.16 When these parties seek exoneration through
the courts, the forum in which nearly eighty percent of the
post-conviction exonerations since 1989 have occurred,'7 they face
limited procedural options. They may make a motion for new trial
based on newly discovered evidence (an option often accompanied by
8 In 2010, the Innocence Project reported that "[tihere have been 252 post-conviction
DNA exonerations in the United States." The Innocence Project, Facts on Post-Conviction DNA
Exonerations, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/35l.php (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
9 Of the 340 exonerations identified in a report investigating exonerations from 1989
through 2003, 196 occurred without the help of DNA evidence. Gross et al., supra note 1, at
524.
10 Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1647 (2008)
[hereinafter Garrett, Innocence] (quoting Brief for the Innocence Project, Inc. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 19, House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (No. 04-8990), available
at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/house/Housev._Bell_InnocenceProjectAmicusBrief
.pdf.
Id. (DNA testing, unlike other forensic and non-biological techniques, allows
"data-based, probabilistic assessments of the meaning of evidentiary 'matches."' (footnote
omitted)).
12 See, e.g., infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing family members' efforts
to exonerate Timothy Cole after Cole died in prison).
13 See, e.g., infra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the Texas Innocence
Project's role in obtaining the posthumous exoneration of Timothy Cole); infra notes
120-22 (discussing innocence groups' role in attempting to obtain DNA testing for deceased
capital defendants believed to be innocent).
14 See, e.g., infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (discussing religious groups'
participation in motions to obtain DNA testing to prove capital defendants' innocence).
15 See, e.g., infra notes 120-22 (describing the Boston Globe's efforts to obtain access to
evidence for DNA testing to prove the innocence of deceased capital defendants).
16 See, e.g., Miles Moffeit & Susan Greene, Trashing the Truth: Telltale Traces, DENVER
POST, July 22, 2007, at lA (discussing the Italian government's support of a capital defendant's
motion for DNA testing in Roger Coleman's 1992 Virginia death penalty case).
17 See, e.g., Gross et al., supra note 1, at 524 (describing how, of the 340 exonerations
identified between 1989 and 2003, 263 involved dismissals of criminal charges by courts based
on new evidence).
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a strict statute of limitations),'8 raise a habeas claim, 19 or invoke
coram nobis, either in its common-law form or through a judicial or
legislative codification, to address facts and evidence previously not
before the court.20 When successful, these efforts typically result in
formal dismissal of charges, vacation of an indictment and conviction,
reversal of a case with instructions for a directed verdict of not guilty,
21
or acquittal on retrial based on proof of non-participation in a crime.
Recently, some states have also passed innocence legislation to
provide a formal venue through which parties may request DNA
testing, although these laws generally do not provide a process for
formal exoneration if the testing proves the defendant's innocence.2 2
Due to these limited options, parties have turned to creative methods
to obtain a formal exoneration. Although with decreasing frequency,
some exonerations have occurred through state governors' and
executive boards' pardons; 23  others occur through prosecutors'
extrajudicial decisions to drop charges at the post-conviction stage.24
Many academic studies of post-conviction exonerations focus
on the evidentiary and investigative errors leading to wrongful
convictions, including reliance upon questionable eyewitness
testimony, introduction at trial of false confessions or testimony from
"8 See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners
and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 659 (2005)
[hereinafter Medwed, Up the River] (explaining that "every state currently permits at least some
form of post-trial relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence" but that "[in general, these
remedies are characterized by stringent statutes of limitations").
19 See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995) (allowing federal habeas petitioners
to raise actual innocence claims from state convictions by "support[ing] [their] allegations of
constitutional error with new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,
trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial").
20 See Medwed, Up the River, supra note 18, at 673, 675.
21 See Gross et aL, supra note 1, at 524 (describing how, of the 340 exonerations studied,
263 resulted in dismissal of criminal charges and 31 resulted in acquittal on retrial); see also
infra notes 255-61 and accompanying text (discussing court-based exonerations and the related
procedures).
22 See Garrett, Innocence, supra note 10, at 1682-83, 1719-23, 1723 n.426. In 2008, all
but six states had post-conviction DNA testing statutes. Alabama, Alaska, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and South Dakota had no such statutes, and Oklahoma's statute
expired in 2005. Id. at 1719-23, 1723 n.426. Most states provide no guidance as to how
exoneration should occur after the DNA test has been conducted. Id. at 1683.
23 Many authors argue that pardons are exceedingly rare and that their rate is declining.
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Essay, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1348 (2008) (observing that "grants of executive clemency
have plummeted in recent decades"); Bruce A. Green and Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 485 (2009)
(explaining the rarity of grants of executive clemency). Pardons still, however, make up a
notable percentage of post-conviction exonerations. See, e.g., Gross et al., supra note 1, at 524
(explaining that 42 of the 340 exonerations studied involved cases where "governors (or other
appropriate executive officers) issued pardons based on evidence of the defendants'
innocence").
24 See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 109.
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jailhouse informants, misuse or misidentification of "non-DNA-tested
forensic evidence" such as hair and blood samples,25 and
prosecutorial misconduct, such as the knowing elicitation of perjured
testimony or the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.26
Other literature focuses on the difficulty of obtaining DNA testing or
raising an actual innocence claim in court,27 and suggests ways
to improve access to court, arguing for constitutional innocence
claims and better legislation.2 8 Few of these studies, however,
describe in detail the judicial proceedings or executive actions
that have ultimately exonerated defendants or the findings that were
made as part of those proceedings. 29 This Article will begin to fill this
gap by illuminating the value of posthumous exonerations and their
role in the innocence movement, focusing on how these proceedings
allow courts to make meaningful findings on the causes of the
underlying conviction. It will suggest how the civil, quasi-
inquisitorial investigation followed in one posthumous exoneration in
Texas could serve as a model, not only for subsequent posthumous
proceedings, but also, with certain modifications, for all exonerations,
producing more and better findings on the causes of wrongful
convictions.
Part I will describe the Cole case and the other posthumous
exonerations that have occurred in the last two decades. Part H will
argue that posthumous exonerations are worthwhile from an
individual justice perspective in their provision of remedies, and that
they are justified by the rationale behind the abatement doctrine,
which firmly closes a case and vacates the conviction and indictment
upon the death of the defendant. Although, unlike a posthumous
exoneration, the abatement doctrine requires the closure of a case
25 EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 15 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs
.org/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf.
26 See, e.g., id. (naming "eyewitness identification," "use of forensic evidence," and
"alleged government malfeasance or misconduct" as "common themes" in the trials underlying
twenty-eight wrongful conviction cases studied); The Innocence Project, The Causes of
Wrongful Conviction, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2010)
(showing that, of the first 225 wrongful convictions studied and later corrected through
DNA evidence, 77% were based on "[e]yewitness [m]isidentification," 52% resulted from
"[u]nvalidated/[i]mproper [fJorensics," 23% resulted from "[flalse [c]onfessions/[a]dmissions,"
and 16% resulted from [i]nformants/[s]nitches," and explaining that these totaled to more than
100% because wrongful convictions sometimes have multiple causes).
27 See, e.g., Garrett, Innocence, supra note 10; Medwed, Up the River, supra note 18, at
656-60.
28 See sources cited supra note 27.
29 This is likely due in part to the dearth of such findings, as Gross has noted. See infra
note 225 and accompanying text.
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upon the death of the defendant, it does so for reasons such as fairness
and the avoidance of wrongful conviction-reasons that overlap with
the purposes of posthumous exonerations. Part m will focus on how
posthumous exonerations contribute important data points to a small
set of DNA exonerations used in the study of wrongful convictions,
thus providing more findings to support broader reforms. It will then
describe the failure of existing exoneration procedures to investigate
the causes of wrongful conviction and the resulting creation, in some
states, of innocence commissions. Part IV will argue that posthumous
exonerations offer courts a unique opportunity to conduct an inquiry
into how the erroneous conviction was obtained and will urge that
where innocence commissions do not exist, legislatures should
expand the procedural and jurisdictional bases for these proceedings.
This Part will discuss the necessary elements of a useful posthumous
exoneration statute, comparing arguments for quasi-inquisitorial and
adversarial exoneration proceedings. The Article will conclude that,
while posthumous exonerations may present the best opportunity for
generating judicial findings on the factors leading to the conviction of
innocent defendants, these findings should be encouraged in all
exonerations.
I. PoSTHuMous EXONERATIONS: FIVE DEFENDANTS, FOUR STATES
A. Defining and Counting Exonerations
The true number of exonerations, including posthumous ones, is
difficult to identify. Samuel Gross, in a University of Michigan study
of exonerations from 1989 through 2003 that offers the "most
comprehensive compilation of exonerations available,"3 o identified
a total of 340 exonerations during that time period-144 of
which relied upon DNA evidence 31-but emphasized that the study
32
was not exhaustive. Because the criminal justice system is
administered at multiple levels of government, and because capital
cases tend to get much of the focus, many exonerations fail to surface
in even the most detailed studies.3 3 Gross suggests that if prison
sentences were reviewed as scrupulously as death sentences, the
past fifteen years would have yielded over 29,000 "non-death
row exonerations," assuming the same exoneration rate for death and
30 Gross et al., supra note 1, at 525.
31 Id. at 524.




non-death cases.34 On the other hand, he observes, death cases likely
involve more false convictions due to investigative challenges, the
guilty individual's strong incentive to frame another defendant, and
prosecutors' and society's desire to bring individuals to justice for
the most "heinous crimes" committed.35 Others, however, argue that
non-capital cases may lead to more erroneous convictions. Many
non-capital rape cases, for example, rely heavily on eyewitness
testimony, which is one of the leading causes of wrongful
conviction.36 Further, given the "greater scrutiny" that capital cases
receive, "they may be less susceptible to error than noncapital
cases." 37 Despite this disagreement, all agree that exonerations
are difficult to identify and impossible to accurately tally. 3 8
The challenge of identifying and counting innocence cases is
also exacerbated by differing definitions of exoneration; the term
"exoneration" can be applied to a number of different proceedings
and outcomes. Exoneration-whether it occurs as part of an executive
order, a one-line statement by a judge, or an unusually detailed
posthumous proceeding-generally indicates a full erasure of a
previous conviction, which is retroactively deemed erroneous. The
subject of an exoneration is an innocent person convicted of a crime.
C. Ronald Huff, Ayre Rattner, and Edward Sagarin define these
"convicted innocents" as "people who have been arrested on criminal
charges . . . who have either pleaded guilty to the charge or have
been tried and found guilty; and who, notwithstanding plea or verdict,
are in fact innocent." 3 9 Samuel Gross has a somewhat more
fine-grained definition of innocent defendants, identifying them as
those whose cases represent "undisputed" misidentifications of
40 dfnthe perpetrator. He defines such undisputed misidentifications as
4 Id. at 532.
3s Id.
36 See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIMA. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 785-86 (2007) (arguing that the
wrongful conviction rate might be higher in non-homicide, pre-DNA rape cases than in death
penalty cases, but that "[tihere are no good data on this issue directly").
37 SCOTr CHRISTIANSON, INNOCENT: INSIDE WRONGFUL CONVICTION CASEs 21 (2004).
But see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and
Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 587, 589 (2005) (observing that only a small subset of capital cases have
involved "significant postconviction scrutiny of the accuracy of the underlying conviction").
38 See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 74 (2003) ("The
reality is that we do not and cannot know how many innocent people are convicted.").
39 C. RONALD HUFF, ARYE RATTNER & EDWARD SAGARIN, CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT:
WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 10 (1996).
4 Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 395, 412 (1987). Gross's report addresses eyewitness misidentification of
innocent defendants.
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those where "(1) there has been a judicial or executive determination
of the innocence of the accused or (2) the prosecuting authority that
originally charged the defendant now agrees that he or she is in fact
innocent."Al
This Article will generally discuss cases that fit Gross's definition
of innocence.4 2 Therefore, it will count as exonerations only those
cases that officially relieve a factually innocent, convicted individual
of any guilt associated with the crime charged, whether through
dropped charges, a dismissed indictment and vacated conviction, a
reversal or acquittal that specifically declares the individual innocent
or otherwise free of guilt and vacates the conviction,43 or an official
pardon or similar executive exoneration granted on actual innocence
grounds.
Although definitions differ, and the exact number of exonerations
for wrongful convictions in the United States cannot be determined,
some conclusions may be safely drawn. Due to the availability
of DNA testing, the exoneration rate has greatly increased in
recent years-from an average of twelve annually from 1989 through
1994" to eighteen annually from 2000 through 200945-and there
have been very few posthumous exonerations.46
41 Id.
42 The extent to which guilt must be withdrawn from an individual's record to establish a
true exoneration varies to some degree. Huff, Rattner, and Sagarin, for example, do not require
erasure of guilt by an official body. Instead, in their 1996 study of convicted innocents, they
define exonerated individuals as those whose innocence has been "either admitted by the
prosecution and the police or so clearly established as to be beyond question." HUFF ET AL.,
supra note 39, at 10-11. In a study of post-conviction DNA exonerations, Brandon Garrett and
Peter Neufeld, following a narrower definition, identify exonerated defendants as those whose
"conviction was vacated by a court or [who] received an executive pardon after DNA test results
excluded them, and . . . were not retried." Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 4, at 12 n.26. In
comparison, Samuel Gross's comprehensive report on DNA exonerations from 1989 through
2003 defines an exoneration as "an official act declaring a defendant not guilty of a crime for
which he or she had previously been convicted." Gross et al., supra note 1, at 524. This includes
governors' or other executives' pardons, acquittals on retrial, dismissal by courts on the basis of
new evidence, and the relatively infrequent posthumous acknowledgment by states that a
deceased defendant is innocent. Id Similarly, the Innocence Commission for Virginia defines an
"official exoneration" as one that occurs through "a governor's pardon or a court's order, or
when prosecutors concede[] that the wrong person has been convicted." INNOCENCE COMM'N
FOR VA., A VISION FOR JUSTICE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING WRONGFUL
CoNvIcrIONS IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 3 (2005), available at http://www.the
justiceproject.org/wp-content/uploadsla-vision-for-justice.pdf.
43 Major studies of exonerations of innocent defendants exclude defendants acquitted due
to the "exclusion of crucial evidence ... or other violations of suspects' rights," HUFF ET AL.,
supra note 39, at 11, or "insufficient evidence of identity or ... improper use of suggestive
identification procedures," Gross, supra note 40, at 412. For purposes of this Article, I also
follow this method.
" Gross et al., supra note 1, at 527.
45 See Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Browse Profiles, http://www.innocenceproject
.org/knowlBrowse-Profiles.php (last visited Mar. 16, 2010). Of the 182 exonerations in the
ten-year period from 2000 to 2009, 15 occurred in 2000, 20 in 2001, 24 in 2002, 18 in 2003, 13
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B. Known Posthumous Exonerations
Timothy Cole's case is a rare example of a posthumous
exoneration based on DNA evidence. Gross's study identified only
four cases between 1989 and 2003 wherein "states posthumously
acknowledged the innocence of defendants who had already died in
prison,"47 only one of which-the exoneration of Frank Lee Smith of
Florida-used DNA evidence to prove innocence.48 The Saint
Petersburg Times believed Smith's case to be "the first time in this
country that posthumous DNA testing has proved a person's
innocence."4 9
1. The Cole Court of Inquiry
In 1985, a student in a parking lot in Lubbock, Texas was raped in
her car. She immediately reported the crime, providing a detailed
description of her assailant.50 Similar previous attacks indicated the
presence of a serial rapist in Lubbock, and the Lubbock police
conducted stakeouts of the area in which the assaults had begun.5 '
Timothy Cole, who resembled a description of the composite drawing
created by police artists, visited a pizza parlor near the scene of the
crime several weeks after the rape had occurred and quickly became a
prime suspect, despite inconsistencies between his behavior and the
behavior of the serial rapist, as well as significant exculpatory
evidence.52 The police obtained a picture of Cole and placed it in a
lineup; Cole's photo was a Polaroid of him looking straight ahead,
which stood out among the other mug shots of men looking away.53
The victim tentatively identified Mr. Cole as the rapist in the photo
lineup, stating, "I think that is him," which led the police to write,
"That is him" beside Cole's picture.54 After the police arrested Cole,
the victim identified him as the assailant in a live lineup the following
day,55 after which the police stated that the victim "was positive of
in 2004, 19 in 2005, 18 in 2006, 19 in 2007, 14 in 2008 and 22 in 2009. Id.
46 See Gross et al., supra note 1, at 524 (identifying only four posthumous exonerations
between 1989 and 2003).
47 Id.
48 See Sydney P. Freedberg, He Didn't Do It, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 7, 2001, at IA
49 Id.
50 Cole Decision, supra note 5, at 3.
51 Id. at 4, 7.
52 Id. at 4-7.
5 Id. at 5-6.
s4 Id. at 6.
5 Id. at 7.
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[her] identification and there [was] no doubt in her mind."56 The
victim, however, had not made a statement to this effect.57 Blood
serum and gross hair analysis were inconclusive but did not exclude
Cole, who was charged, convicted, and sentenced to twenty-five years
in prison in September 1986.
In 1995, a convicted rapist named Jerry Johnson sent a letter to
Lubbock County judges explaining that he had committed the crime,
requesting that they allow him to confess and that they clear Timothy
Cole's name.5 9 The judges ignored the letter.6 After serving more
than thirteen years of his sentence, all the while asserting his
innocence,6 1 Cole died in 1999 of an asthma attack in prison,62 which
was "exacerbated" by his work in the prison cotton fields.63 The
Innocence Project of Texas eventually took up Cole's case and
discovered evidence that pointed definitively to Johnson, including
DNA from the victim's clothing, which the Project had persuaded the
Lubbock district attorney to locate and test.64 Johnson, in the
meantime, was finally able to make a written confession with the
assistance of Texas Tech law students.6 5
Cole's surviving family members, joined by the victim of the
crime,66 petitioned to clear Cole's name under a Texas statute that
allows a state district court judge to convene a court of inquiry to
investigate "offense[s] . . . committed against the laws of [Texas]."
A Lubbock county court denied their original motion to convene a
court of inquiry, and the family, represented by the Innocence Project
of Texas and Barry Scheck of the Innocence Project, filed a petition
with another county court, asking that a court of inquiry be
convened.68 This second court agreed, 69 asserting its jurisdiction
56 Id. (alteration in original).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 8.
s9 Id.
60 Id.
61 Cole fought the conviction until his appeals ran out and was repeatedly denied parole
because he refused to confess guilt. Id.
62 Id.
63 See Jordan Smith, Cole's Posthumous Exoneration Is First for Texas, AUSTIN.
AM. STATESMAN, Feb. 13, 2009, http://www.austinchronicle.com/gyrobase/Issue/story?oid
=oid:740144.
6 See Cole Decision, supra note 5, at 9, 15.
65 Id. at 9.
6 See id. at t (listing Michele Mallin, the victim, as a petitioner).
67 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 52.01(a) (Vernon 2006).
68 Id.
69 Id. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which granted the court authority to
convene a court of inquiry, simply provides:
When a judge of any district court of this state, acting in his capacity as magistrate,
696 [Vol. 60:3
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under the court of inquiry statute and two provisions of the Texas
Constitution: 70 article 1, section 13, which requires that "every
person for an injury done him ... shall have remedy by due course of
law,"71 and article 1, section 30, which provides crime victims with a
right to be "treated with fairness and with respect ... throughout the
criminal justice process."72  The court conducted a thorough
investigation of the case through sworn testimony and documentary
evidence in a two-day hearing.73 At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court ordered, adjudged, and decreed in April 2009 that Cole "was,
and is, innocent of the crime for which he was convicted and
imprisoned," thus exonerating Cole and "forever" removing "[a]ll
legal disabilities attaching to him and his survivors as a result of
his wrongful conviction."7 4 In reaching this conclusion, the court
relied on the strong DNA evidence, which was attested to in a Texas
Department of Public Safety Report;75 errors in the eyewitness
identification process;76 and the other evidence pointing toward
Johnson as the perpetrator.77
As a result of the exoneration granted by Judge Baird, a Texas
state senator requested an opinion from the Attorney General on the
legality of granting a posthumous exoneration.78 The Attorney
General confirmed the legality of this practice, 79 and in March 2010
the governor granted Cole a full posthumous pardon.80
has probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed against the laws of
this state, he may request that the presiding judge of the administrative judicial
district appoint a district judge to commence a Court of Inquiry.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 52.01(a). The statute does not limit the number of times a
party may request a court of inquiry. See id.
70 Cole Decision, supra note 5, at 1-2.
7' TEx. CONST. art. I, 13.
72 TEx. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1).
73 See Cole Decision, supra note 5, at 1.
74 Id. at 16.
7s Id. at 9.
76 See id. at 11-12.
77 See id. at 13.
78 See Press Release, Office of Senator Rodney Ellis, Ellis Asks for AG Opinion on Cole
Pardon (July 17, 2009), available at http://www.rodneyellis.com/news/?id-0127.
7 Authority of the Governor to Grant a Posthumous Pardon, Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No.
GA-0754 (Jan. 7, 2010), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/opinions/50abbott/op/
2010/htm/ga-0754.htm (explaining that a previous attorney general opinion concluded that
posthumous pardons were not permitted but that "the modern development of United States
Supreme Court precedent supports the Governor's authority to issue posthumous pardons," and
that "a Texas court would likely conclude that the Governor may grant a posthumous pardon
under current Texas law").
so See Press Release, Office of the Governor Rick Perry, Gov. Perry Grants Posthumous
Pardon for Innocence to Tim Cole (Mar. 1, 2010), available at http://governor.state.tx.us/
news/press-release/14312/.
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2. Other Posthumous Exonerations
Cole's case is one of a small number of posthumous exonerations.
As noted above, only four others have occurred since 1989, and none
of these cases generated the types of detailed findings produced in
Cole.8 1 Further, only Frank Lee Smith's case, in which the court also
relied upon DNA evidence in posthumously exonerating Smith, bears
a resemblance to Cole's.
Frank Lee Smith pleaded not guilty to first-degree murder and
sexual battery of an eight-year-old girl, but in 1986 a Florida jury
found him guilty and sentenced him to death.82 At trial, the State's
evidence consisted primarily of a statement by Smith and three
witness identifications. One witness stated that he had a conversation
with a man near the victim's house, but that he could not recall "how
the guy looked" and could not positively identify Smith.83 The
victim's mother testified that when she arrived home, she saw a man
from a distance and later identified him as Smith by observing his
shoulders. The third and most credible witness at the time of trial
stated that a man near the victim's house had flagged her down the
night of the crime, and she later identified this man as Smith."
Following trial, however, the third witness signed an affidavit
recanting her testimony and positively identifying another
perpetrator.86
After a long line of appeals and requests for post-conviction
relief,87 Smith found some reprieve when the Florida Supreme Court
granted a stay of execution and reversed the trial court's summary
denial of his motion under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
holding that the trial court erred in "failing to conduct an evidentiary
hearing to evaluate [the] newly discovered evidence"-specifically,
88the new affidavit of the key witness. Later, the Florida Supreme
Court again vacated and remanded Smith's case on the grounds of
improper ex parte communications between the state attorney and the
trial court judge.89 In the meantime, the state attorney's office began
to worry about the shaky case and filed a motion for crime-scene
a1 This Article argues, however, that these types of cases still present courts with an
opportunity to make such findings.
82 See Smith v. Dugger, 565 So. 2d 1293, 1294 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam).
83 Id. at 1295-96.
8 See id. at 1295.
as See id. at 1295-96.
86 See id. at 1296.
8 See Smith v. State, 708 So. 2d 253, 254 (Fla. 1998) (per curiam).
88 Dugger, 565 So. 2d at 1297.
89 See Smith, 708 So. 2d at 254-55.
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evidence to allow for DNA testing.90 This motion was denied, and the
state attorney's office reversed course, resisting the defense attorneys'
later requests for DNA testing.9' In late 2000, DNA results from an
FBI analysis confirmed that Smith was not guilty.92 Smith, however,
had died in prison of pancreatic cancer earlier that year.93 Smith was
posthumously exonerated on December 22, 2000, when a county
circuit judge granted, in a one-page order, the State's motion to vacate
and set aside judgments.94
The three other posthumous exonerations identified by Gross,
which did not rely upon DNA evidence, occurred in Massachusetts
and Indiana. In 1965, the "Salvati Four"-Joseph Salvati, Peter
Limone, Louis Greco, and Henry Tameleo-were convicted
of first-degree murder in a "gangland slaying" in Chelsea,
Massachusetts. 95 Salvati was sentenced to life in frison, and the
remaining defendants were sentenced to death. 6 In 2000, a
Department of Justice task force investigating corruption in Boston's
FBI office released FBI records that implicated another defendant in
the murder.97 Then, in 2002, a congressional committee released a
deposition showing that the crucial witness in the Salvati Four case
was a hit man recruited by the FBI to give perjured testimony in
exchange for a highly beneficial plea bargain;98 there was strong
evidence that this crucial witness had done the killing.99 Further, an
FBI document released in 2001 showed that prior to trial, the FBI
had received an informant list naming the murderers and that this list
did not include any members of the Salvati Four.U0 Given this newly
released evidence, in 2001, Limone and Salvati separately moved for
new trials in Middlesex Superior Court with the district attorney's
support.10' The court vacated their convictions based on the new
9 Freedberg, supra note 48.
91 Id.
9 Id.; Dan Malone, DNA Test Clears Man After Death; Condemned Inmate's Case May
Prompt More Reviews, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 16, 2000, at lA.
9 Freedberg, supra note 48.
SFlorida v. Smith, No. 85-4654 CFlOA (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 2000) (on file with
author).
9 Ralph Ranalli, FBI Used Hit Man As Informant, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2002, at A30.
96 Stanley Z. Fisher, Convictions of Innocent Persons in Massachusetts: An Overview, 12
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 41 (2002).
9 See id. at 42-43.
98 See Ranalli, supra note 95.
9 See Jonathan Wells, Another Day in Court, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 4, 2001, at 5 (noting
that a defense attorney affidavit released in early January 2001 showed that one of the attorney's
clients had told him that the crucial witness had planned the killing).
I0J.M. Lawrence, Men Jailed in Mob Hit Clear Final Hurdle, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 31,
2001, at 5 [hereinafter Lawrence, Men Jailedj.
101 Wells, supra note 99 (stating that the "Suffolk County District Attorney ... is preparing
to seek new trials" for Salvati and Limone and to "support Limone's motion to stay the
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evidence. 10 2 Salvati had already been released from prison due to a
commutation,10 3 but the court ordered Limone released, stating: "The
conduct of certain agents of the bureau ... stains the legacy of the
FBI."104 Later that month, the district attorney "filed a strongly
worded nolle prosequi declaring the state's decision not to further
prosecute," stating that "[t]he Commonwealth has concluded that it
does not now have a good faith basis-legally or ethically-to
proceed with any further prosecution" against Salvati, but the
statement "stopped short of dropping charges." 0 5 The district attorney
filed a similar motion for Limone."'0
Limone and Salvati were thus exonerated after serving more than
thirty years in prison. Greco, however, had died in prison five
years earlier, 107 and Tameleo was also deceased when his living
co-defendants were exonerated. 08 In November 2004, the Suffolk
District Attorney's office exonerated Louis Greco by filing a motion
in Suffolk Superior Court to "drop all charges against Greco
posthumously," citing "legal and ethical considerations raised by the
newly discovered FBI documents, as well as principles of consistency
and fundamental fairness.""09 The Boston Herald reported that the
District Attorney's office also "posthumously vacated the 1968 life
sentence of Henry Tameleo" in January 2007, although it did not
describe whether the office followed the same procedure for
exoneration.110 In an unusually successful tort case filed after the
exonerations, the families of the Salvati Four obtained more than
$100 million in damages under theories of malicious prosecution and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 111
execution of his life sentence").
1o2Lawrence, Men Jailed, supra note 100, at 5.
103 Id.
1 o*Id.
10 1d. Because the district attorney's office formally indicated that it would not further
prosecute, and given the FBI's evidence that the Salvati Four were not involved in the murder,
this Article counts the case as an "exoneration," as does Samuel Gross. See Gross et al., supra
note 1, at 524. The facts, however, do not fully fit within this Article's definition of exoneration.
The case is included because it is one of the few examples of a posthumous exoneration and fits
most of the definitional components of such an exoneration.
10 6 Lawrence, Men Jailed, supra note 100, at 5.
I10J.M. Lawrence, Ex-Wife Recounts Plight of Wrongfully Imprisoned Man, BOSTON
HERALD, Jan. 9, 2001, at 4.
'
08 See Ranalli, supra note 95.
109 J.M. Lawrence, Suffolk DA Clears Greco Posthumously on 1965 Murder Rap, BOSTON
HERALD, Nov. 4, 2004, at 32 [hereinafter Lawrence, Suffolk DA].
110 News in Brief; 15 Years After Death Life Sentence Nixed, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 26,
2007, at 17.
M See Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 250-51 (D. Mass. 2007). On appeal,
the First Circuit affirmed the full award of damages on the alternate finding of emotional
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The final known, recent posthumous exoneration occurred in
Indiana. A woman in a rural Indiana farmhouse was killed in 1975,
and investigators searched in vain for the killer for two years.112
In 1977, seventeen-year-old John Jeffers, who was in a juvenile
detention facility, told guards that he and another teenage boy
had committed the murder.1 3 His story had inconsistencies, and
Jeffers did not match the description of the suspects provided by
witnesses.114 He changed his story to correspond with news accounts,
however, and was charged with murder, pleaded guilty, and was
sentenced to thirty years in prison." 5 In 2001-almost twenty years
after Jeffers had died in prison-a woman confessed that she and
her ex-husband had committed the murder.1 6 Although she had made
the same confession twenty-seven years earlier to a church group,
it had been ignored."'7 In 2003, the confessor's husband was
convicted and sentenced to forty-five to sixty-five years in prison, and
the state indicated that it was persuaded that Jeffers had not
committed the murder." 8 There is, however, no evidence of an
official posthumous exoneration of Jeffers by state prosecutors or the
courts, aside from the fact that another murderer has now been
convicted in the case.119
These five cases appear to be the only posthumous exonerations in
the past two decades, although several additional unsuccessful
attempts have been made. The Boston Globe, religious groups, and
innocence projects have made several requests in court for DNA
testing in cases of deceased capital defendants. For example, their
request in Ellis Wayne Felker's case in Georgia was successful,12 0
although the DNA tests ordered by the court produced only
inconclusive results.121 Similarly, in the Virginia Coleman case,
advocates eventually persuaded Governor Mark Warner to order
distress. See Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 108 (1st Cir. 2009).
112 See Jon Yates & Kevin Lynch, Confession Leads to 2 Arrests in '75 Killing, CHI. TRIB.,








"18 Jodi S. Cohen, Man Found Guilty in 1975 Slaying of Woman in Indiana, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 20, 2003, § 2, at 5; see also Yates & Lynch, supra note 112 (noting that, after the 2001
confessions, investigators were "convinced Jeffers had nothing to do with the killing,
confirming what many in the community believed all along").
"19 See Cohen, supra note 118.
120 See Malone, supra note 92, at IA (describing the parties and the case).
121 See Maria Glod & Michael D. Shear, Warner Orders DNA Testing in Case of Man
Executed in '92, WASH. PoST, Jan. 6, 2006, at Al.
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DNA tests more than fourteen years after the defendant's
execution.122 The tests showed that the defendant was indeed
guilty.123
The paucity of posthumous exonerations may be explained, in part,
by the legal system's traditional hesitance, seen in the common-law
doctrine of abatement, to continue criminal proceedings after the
death of the defendant. This Article will later discuss the importance
of posthumous exonerations to the broader innocence movement. The
following Part, however, will address their value to the families of
innocent defendants, as well as crime victims and the larger
community, arguing that these considerations alone justify departing
from the usual practice of ending criminal proceedings upon the
defendant's death.
II. INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE AFTER DEATH: THE ARGUMENT FOR
REOPENING THE CLOSED BOOK
The posthumous exoneration is, like every other exoneration, a
means of obtaining individual justice. Because wrongful convictions
affect victims, families, and the public at large, they have
consequences that linger past the death of the defendant. As
illustrated by courts' justifications for the abatement doctrine-which
acts primarily for the benefit of the individual defendant by
abruptly ending a case upon his death-the need to address these
consequences outweighs the need for finality.
A. Righting the Wrong
Although posthumous exonerations can serve a valuable role in the
effort to prevent wrongful convictions by producing instructive
findings on their causes, this will often not be the primary reason for
which they are sought or conducted. A central justifying purpose
behind all forms of exoneration is the core human need to
retroactively erase a poor reputation wrongly attributed to an
individual. In many senses, this is a remedial need, rooted in
corrective justice,124 to right the wrongs and restore the injured,
122 See id.
123 See Moffeit & Greene, supra note 16.
124 See Starr, supra note 2, at 1532-33 ("Constitutional remedies have traditionally sought
to repair the impact of the violation to 'the greatest possible degree'-that is, to make the
defendant whole. This idea, which is a form of 'corrective justice,' has also played a central role
in private law." (footnote omitted)).
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wrongfully convicted individual (and those around him) to a "status
quo ante."l 2 5
Although the wronged individual cannot personally benefit from
this remedy, it is important. The instinctive need for justice does not
end with a defendant's death, but continues to be felt by his family
and friends, the greater community, and the victim of the crime:
One of the results of conviction is 'infamy'-the offender's
name is besmirched, her reputation ruined. When a person
has been wrongfully convicted, even long after the unjust
sentence has been served, sometimes long after the convict is
dead, friends of the wrongly punished person may seek a
pardon. Why?-to establish her innocence, to clear her good
name, to make sure that her name does not "live on in
infamy."1 2 6
Carol and Jordan Steiker similarly recognize the reputational
consequences of wrongful convictions, observing that "those who
are innocent and sentenced to death suffer the additional devastation
of being blamed for a terrible crime; their names, families, and entire
lives are forever tainted by such ignominy, quite apart from the death
of their bodies."l27 This permanent stain, although it can never be
fully erased, is best addressed by a formal exoneration, which
serves as a revisionary practice to end "a range of appropriate
negative responses triggered by a wrongful action."l28 As Meir
Dan-Cohen observes, the exoneration is the means by which "stigma
125 Margaret Jane Radin, Essay, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56,
61 (1993). This Article, in the interest of brevity, presents a simplified view of remedy through
compensation. As Radin has taught us, views on compensation conflict. Under a "quid pro quo"
commodified conception of compensation, the status quo ante can be restored through the
payment of "the cost in dollars of the injury." Id. at 59. But under the core noncommodified
conception of compensation, "dollars and exchange" are not the answer to harm, unless the
monetary compensation for harm is viewed as an action "to symbolize public respect for the
existence of certain rights and public recognition of the transgressor's fault in disrespecting
those rights." Id. at 60-61.
126 KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 136
(1989).
27 Steiker & Steiker, supra note 37, at 588. Although they note these consequences, they
also observe that focusing too much on the wrongful conviction of innocent defendants,
particularly in the capital context, could distract from more important issues. See id. at 597
(arguing that "the comparative prevalence of . . . injustices [other than the execution of an
innocent defendant] suggests that the risk of executing innocents might deserve less attention
than other normative claims against the death penalty").
128 Meir Dan-Cohen, Revising the Past: On the Metaphysics of Repentance, Forgiveness,
and Pardon, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 117, 117 (Austin Sarat & Nasser
Hussain eds., 2007). Dan-Cohen discusses exonerations that occur in the form of a pardon. See
id.
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is officially removed," 2 9 an action of "erasing a nasty event from
one's record."130 This stigma is, of course, felt most keenly by
the wrongfully convicted defendant, but undoubtedly extends to
those close to him. Timothy Cole's mother, for example, cited a
"commitment[]" she had made to her son to "clear his name."'31
The posthumous exoneration thus serves the remedial function
that Frederick Lawrence has called "de-stigmatization"-a "full
rectification of the harm from false accusations and convictions,"1 3 2
and an assurance that the exoneree's family can benefit from his
restored "standing in society."133 A "stigma" is a necessary precursor
to all of the central theories underlying criminal punishment,
according to Lawrence, and its removal plays an important role, even
in a posthumous case. In the retributive realm, desert of punishment
cannot attach "[i]n the absence of stigma."l 34 Nor would deterrence
occur, in the consequentialist camp, without a stigma that sent a
message to society at large.13 5 And under the "expressive theor[y] of
punishment," the stigma serves as the defining point for comparing
the individual's acts to society's values and judging accordingly.' 3 6 A
court's erasure of stigma, under all three theories, removes the
grounds for criminal punishment.
In removing stigma and thus the basis for punishment, a
posthumous exoneration clears the exoneree's name. In this way,
posthumous exonerations serve a function similar to that served by
Lawrence's proposed judicial remedy for wrongful convictions, a
lawsuit modeled on a defamation claim that would focus on the
"falseness of the accusation of conviction" 3 7 and would grant relief
in the form of a declaration of innocence. 38
Neither Lawrence's proposed declaration-of-innocence suits nor
posthumous exonerations award monetary damages. Of course,
posthumous exonerations, like innocence declarations, could support
later compensation under a tort theoryl 39-as occurred in the
129Id.
1301d. at 121.
131 Elliott Blackburn, Hope Deferred: Tim Cole's Family Gets DNA Report Proving What
They Always Knew, AVALANCHE-JOURNAL, June 30, 2008, http://www.lubbockonline.com/
stories/063008/loc_297531088.shtml.
132 Frederick Lawrence, Declaring Innocence: Use of Declaratory Judgments to Vindicate
the Wrongly Convicted, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 391, 397 (2009).
133 Id.
13 Id. at 396.35 Id.
136 Id. at 396-97.
'3 Id. at 400.
138 See id. at 398-400 (citing Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel
Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its Proper Place, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1287 (1988)).
39See id. at 400-01 (discussing how a declaration of innocence could potentially bind a
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Salvati Four case 40or under a statutory mechanism providing
compensation to exonerees' families. The posthumous exoneration,
particularly if it occurs in tandem with compensation, perhaps
falls within Margaret Jane Radin's "redress" conception of
compensation,141 a form of corrective justice "showing the victim that
her rights are taken seriously," which is "accomplished by affirming
that some action is required to symbolize . . . public recognition of
the transgressor's fault in disrespecting those rights."l 4 2 In the
posthumous exoneration, the transgressor is the government, which
has harmed the deceased defendant, the defendant's family, and
society.
Posthumous exonerations, like all exonerations, are also important
to the community and its sense of fairness and justice. As such, they
also serve an expressive remedial function for the community. As
Sonja Starr explains, "[g]overnment actions can .. . inflict expressive
harms,"l 4 3 meaning that they violate core principles shared by society,
or "undermine collective understandings."'" Starr notes that "[o]ne
objective of legal remedies is to combat these kinds of expressive
harms, to respond to a wrongful message with a better message.
Community members are outraged by the knowledge that one of their
neighbors has been wrongly convicted and by the thought that the
same fate could befall them.14 6 Posthumous exonerations help restore
state board that allocates compensation to wronged individuals (citing Tennison v. Cal. Victim
Comp. & Gov't Claims Bd., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 94 (Ct. App. 2007))).
140See Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 250-51 (D. Mass. 2007) (awarding
more than $100 million in damages to the families of the Salvati Four on the basis of malicious
prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress). On appeal, the First Circuit
affirmed the full award on the basis of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Limone v.
United States, 579 F.3d 79, 108 (1st Cir. 2009).
141 See Radin, supra note 125, at 60-61.
t
42 Id. at 61.
143 Starr, supra note 2, at 1534; see also Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1527-28 (2000)
("A person suffers [expressive] harm when she is treated according to principles that
communicate negative or inappropriate attitudes toward her .... ).
144 Starr, supra note 2, at 1534 (quoting Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps:
Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 755
(1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145 Id. at 1535.
146See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 37, at 588 (observing that the "[plublic fear of
unjust violence at the hands of the state" arises as a result of wrongful convictions and
executions). But see Malone, supra note 92 (suggesting that even with evidence of exoneration,
communities may not be swayed, observing that "[n]ational polls show that although many
believe some innocent people may have been executed, most Americans still favor capital
punishment," and quoting a forensic scientist who believes "[b]ecause it's the nature of gut
belief, I honestly don't think [DNA exoneration is] going to change things very much").
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a feeling of justice to communities and suggest that equity prevails 4 7
or, at least, offer the "closure" desired by, for example, residents in
Knox County, Indiana, following the posthumous proof of John
Jeffers's innocence, which ended a case that had been "on
everybody's mind" for years.148
Posthumous exonerations can also be of great importance to the
crime victims and other witnesses who later learn that the wrong man
was convicted. For those who have unwittingly contributed to the
conviction of an innocent man, participating in, or even learning of, a
posthumous exoneration can be a valuable way of addressing
lingering doubts and possible feelings of guilt and anger. The rape
victim in Timothy Cole's case, for example, was one of the parties
who petitioned to convene a court of inquiry to clear Cole's name.14 9
In Jeffers's case, the victim's mother expressed relief when another
individual eventually confessed, explaining that she was "just glad"
and that she and her family "had a feeling [Jeffers] didn't do it." 50
And the witness who was pressured to testify against Frank Lee Smith
and later recanted her testimony visits Smith's grave regularly."'
Of course, posthumous exonerations, for all of their sound
justifications, do not always bring feelings of justice, closure, and
equity. Although Cole's family showed "signs of healing" following
posthumous proof of his innocence-one of his brothers went back to
college, and the other entered a drug and alcohol treatment program
and appeared "optimistic" about his futurel 52-other members of
deceased defendants' families view the remedy as insufficient and
untimely. A close friend of Louis Greco, reacting to the posthumous
exoneration that occurred more than thirty-five years after his
conviction and approximately eight years after his death in prison,
summed up his view in three words: "Big [expletive] deal."l 5 3
Nor are posthumous exonerations always conducted in a manner
that invokes forgiveness, apology, regret, or even the belief that the
person is in fact innocent. The prosecutors of the Salvati Four, for
example, consistently denied any wrongdoing and refused for years
147 Linda Ross Meyer, for example, who discusses exoneration in the form of the pardon,
argues that pardons are "grounded precisely in the connectedness, embeddedness, and finitude
that undergird community and government." Linda Ross Meyer, The Merciful State, in
FORGIVENESS, supra note 128, at 64, 65.
148 Yates & Lynch, supra note 112.
*4 See Cole Decision, supra note 5, at 1.
150 Yates & Lynch, supra note 112.
' See Kevin D. Thompson, Tale of Misdirected Justice Deeply Moving, PALM BEACH
POST, Apr. 11, 2002, at 4E.
52 Blackburn, supra note 131.
153 Lawrence, Suffolk DA, supra note 109.
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to join in the defendants' quests for justice,154 despite federal
investigations showing strong indications of unusual FBI misconduct
in the case, including the FBI's knowledge at the time of the case that
its witness had framed the defendants.155 The motion by the Suffolk
Assistant District Attorney to posthumously drop all charges against
Louis Greco stated, "It appears that justice may not have been
done." 56 This is not the full and unconditional clearing of a man's
name that the family or community might have hoped for. Gross has
similarly described prosecutors' lack of repentance when live
defendants are exonerated. In one DNA exoneration of a death row
defendant, the original prosecutor asserted that "[iut doesn't really
change my opinion that much that [the defendant is] guilty," and
another prosecutor, when dismissing charges against an innocent man
who had spent more than eleven years in prison, insisted that "[t]he
action I have taken today is neither a vindication nor an acquittal of
the defendant." 157
But posthumous exonerations do not only serve to satisfy the need
for forgiveness and closure. They can also inspire prosecutors to
reopen a case and attempt to find the real perpetrator, a valuable
outcome in itself. After the FBI confirmed through DNA evidence
that Frank Lee Smith (then deceased) had not killed an eight-year-old
girl, prosecutors began investigating another suspect.158 In the
Jeffers case, twenty years after Jeffers died in prison, prosecutors
investigated and obtained a conviction for the individual they believe
to be the real killer.159 After the individual's ex-wife belatedly
confessed and implicated both her ex-husband and herself in the
murder, prosecutors believed the details she provided about the
murder to be too accurate to be coincidental, 16 thus leading to his
investigation and eventual conviction. The ex-wife pleaded guilty to
second-degree murder.161
Others have similarly noted exonerations' contribution to the
identification of the real perpetrator. For example, California's
Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, in advocating
Im See Wells, supra note 99, (explaining that "[u]ntil now, prosecutors... have steadfastly
defended the integrity of the prosecution and conviction").
I551d. (explaining the federally released reports that the FBI suppressed evidence of the
four men's innocence, knew who the real killers were, and knew of the murder before it
happened).
5 Lawrence, Suffolk DA, supra note 109.
'57 Gross et al., supra note 1, at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151 See Malone, supra note 92.
15 Cohen, supra note 118.
6 Yates & Lynch, supra note 112.
161 Cohen, supra note 118.
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the continued funding of innocence projects, pointed to the case
of Kevin Green, "whose [pre-death] exoneration in Orange County
led to the conviction of the real murderer and rapist." The
Commission concluded that "the work of innocence projects also
advances the interest of public safety."' 62 Similarly, the Innocence
Project of Virginia observed that, in the case of one exonerated
Virginia defendant, "four other brutal assaults might have been
prevented if the correct perpetrator had been identified and prosecuted
rather than the innocent man who was convicted."l 6 3 Innocence
Project policy directors have more generally observed that the
only person who "benefits from refusing to learn whether or not
an innocent person was convicted of a serious crime" is the
perpetrator.'6" Similarly, Huff, Rattner, and Sagarin argue that it is
important to concentrate on the "small percentage of convicted
innocents," rather than just the "judicially released guilty," for the
following reasons:
(a) The conviction of the innocent leaves the guilty free to
commit more crimes, thus threatening public safety; and (b)
each instance of the conviction of an innocent enhances the
possibility that there will be more not-guilty verdicts against
the truly guilty.165
Posthumous exonerations, then, address the multitude of harms
that result from a wrongful conviction and extend past the defendant's
death. As illustrated by an examination of the rationale behind the
abatement doctrine, these benefits outweigh the arguments for closing
cases upon a defendant's death.
B. Posthumous Exoneration and the Abatement Doctrine
Despite the strong family and community-based justifications
for exonerating wrongfully convicted defendants after death, few
procedural mechanisms exist for conducting such exonerations.16 6
Partially due to these procedural limitations, only five defendants
have been posthumously exonerated since the first DNA exoneration
162 CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
REMEDIES 13 (2008), http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/incompentence/official/REPORT
%20AND%20RECOMMENDATIONS%200N%20REMEDIES.pdf.163 INNOCENCE COMM'N FOR VA., supra note 42, at 1.
1 Mike Wagner & Geoff Dutton, Out of Time: Ohio Restricts Convicts Who Try to Prove
Innocence, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 28, 2008, at Al.
s65 HUFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 12.
166See supra notes 66-123 and accompanying text (detailing the creative court procedures
that have been followed in posthumous exonerations).
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of a live defendant in 1989.167 Although it is impossible to say with
certainty, the dearth of posthumous exonerations may also be due
in part to a legitimate desire for finality. But this objection loses its
force in the face of definitive proof that a conviction is wrongful. A
final limiting factor-and perhaps the strongest-may be the general
refusal of the criminal justice system to engage in posthumous
proceedings, as illustrated by the abatement doctrine, which is the
common-law rule ending criminal process upon the defendant's
death. To the extent that this is the case, however, it is unfortunate, as
a close examination of the abatement doctrine shows that it is
motivated by a desire to prevent the injustice of a wrongful
conviction.
Under the abatement doctrine, cases incomplete at the time of a
defendant's death-including unappealed convictions 68-are erased
on the grounds that "all private criminal injuries or wrongs, as well
as all public crimes, are buried with the offender."1 69 The doctrine
extends to appeals as of right, but not to discretionary or collateral
review. 17 0 In Durham v. United States,171 the Supreme Court made
clear that "death pending direct review of a criminal conviction
abates not only the appeal but also all proceedings had in the
prosecution from its inception."1 72  Traditionally, under these
circumstances, the appellate court treats the case as moot and
dismisses the appeal (if an appeal is pending), "vacating all prior
orders, and remanding the case for dismissal."l 7 3 The defendant "is
'
6 7 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the five defendants
exonerated, see supra Part I.
168 See, e.g., United States v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2001) ("IT]he rule
followed almost unanimously by the Courts of Appeals is that a conviction abates on the death
of the accused before his appeal has been decided."); United States v. Pauline, 625 F.2d 684,
684 (5th Cir. 1980) ("When a defendant dies pending direct appeal of his criminal conviction it
for many years has been the unanimous view of the lower federal courts and the vast majority of
state courts that not only the appeal but also all proceedings had in the prosecution from its
inception are abated." (footnotes omitted)).
169 United States v. Dunne, 173 F. 254, 258 (9th Cir. 1909) (quoting United States v.
Daniel, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 13 (1848)).
1o As the Seventh Circuit has explained, "[tihe Supreme Court may dismiss the petition
[for certiorari] without prejudicing the rights of a deceased petitioner, for he has already had the
benefit of the appellate review of his conviction to which he was entitled of right." United States
v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1977); see also Dove v. United States, 423 U.S.
325, 325 (1976) (per curiam), (refusing to apply the abatement doctrine and thus refusing to
vacate the conviction of a defendant who died pending review of his petition for certiorari).
171 401 U.S. 481 (1971) (per curiam), overruled in part by Dove, 423 U.S. at 325.
17 2 Id. at 483.
"
73 Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d at 127. The only exception to this course of action involves
cases pending on certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, where the Court has
determined that it simply will not take action on the petition. See Dove, 423 U.S. at 325 ("The
Court is advised that the petitioner died .. . on November 14, 1975. The petition for certiorari is
therefore dismissed."). Dove, a per curnam opinion, "overruled" Durham's abatement doctrine in
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deemed never to have been convicted or even charged."1 74
The strength and continued persistence of the abatement doctrine,
even where society is arguably wronged by its application, is
demonstrated by United States v. Lay,175 where the government
agreed that Kenneth Lay's death in July 2006-which occurred
"before sentencing, before a final judgment could be entered, and
before a notice of appeal could be filed"l 7 6-required "abatement ab
initio" of the conviction and indictment but requested that the court
delay the vacation to allow the fraud victims to obtain restitution.17 7
The district court refused the government's request, concluding that
Lay's conviction had to be vacated and the action against him
dismissed. 17 8 Under the abatement doctrine, then, even an "order
of restitution cannot stand in the wake of [a defendant's] death." 79
Most of the federal circuits have also consistently followed this
approach. 180
a terse statement, holding, "[t]o the extent that Durham v. United States ... may be inconsistent
with this ruling, Durham is overruled." Id. Most appellate courts have interpreted this only to
mean that the doctrine does not apply to petitions for certiorari pending before the Court. See
Pauline, 625 F.2d at 685; United States v. Littlefield, 594 F.2d 682, 683 (8th Cir. 1979);
Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d at 128; United States v. Bechtel, 547 F.2d 1379, 1380 (9th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam).
174 United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2004).
17456 F. Supp. 2d 869 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
'
76 Id. at 874.
17 7 Id. at 871.
178Id. at 875. The United States had argued that "the Lay Estate should not be unjustly
enriched with the proceeds of fraud" and asked the court to defer its ruling on the motion filed
by Lay's estate to vacate and dismiss, believing that the verdicts against Lay at least "provide[d]
a basis for the likely disgorgement of fraud proceeds totaling tens of millions of dollars." Id. at
871 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court, disagreeing with the government,
observed that the rule of abatement clearly applies where a defendant dies during the pendency
of an appeal, but also cited the Fifth Circuit's holding that "the rule of abatement applies equally
to cases in which a defendant, such as [Lay], dies prior to the entry of judgment." Id. at 874
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Assett, 990 F.2d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1993))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Further, although the Lay court noted that the United States
Supreme Court has slightly tempered its abatement doctrine from the version originally
developed in Durham by partially overruling it in Dove, it determined that the Court's language
left most of the doctrine intact, with the exception of petitions for certiorari. See Lay, 456 F.
Supp. 2d at 872 (citing Dove, 423 U.S. at 325). Several other circuits have reached this
conclusion as well. See Pauline, 625 F.2d at 685; Littlefield, 594 F.2d at 683; Moehlenkamp,
557 F.2d at 128; Bechtel, 547 F.2d at 1380.
' Parsons, 367 F.3d at 415.
80 The Ninth Circuit, like the Fifth, applies the doctrine not only where an appeal was
pending at the defendant's death, but also where a defendant was convicted and died before he
could raise an appeal. See United States v. Oberlin, 718 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1983) ("We see
no reason to treat a criminal defendant who dies before judgment is entered any differently from
one who dies after a notice of appeal has been filed."). The Fourth Circuit has a similarly broad
abatement doctrine, under which "[d]eath pending appeal of a criminal conviction abates not
only the appeal but all proceedings in the prosecution from its inception." United States v.
Dudley, 739 F.2d 175, 176 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Oberlin, 718 F.2d at 895).
INNOCENCE AFTER DEATH
One of the central justifications for the abatement doctrine is the
understanding that the appeals process-the means of achieving a
final and "correct" result in the American justice system-has been
cut short or suspended before it could have commenced, since
the individual capable of initiating or continuing the appeal is
deceased.181 A decisive result in the case has not been reached and
cannot be reached now that the relevant party is no longer available to
appear in court. Further, the courts reason, "the state should not label
one as guilty until he has exhausted his opportunity to appeal."l82 The
Seventh Circuit, for example, has observed:
[W]hen an appeal has been taken from a criminal conviction
to the court of appeals and death has deprived the accused of
his right to our decision, the interests of justice ordinarily
require that he not stand convicted without resolution of the
merits of his appeal, which is an "integral part of [our] system
for finally adjudicating [his] guilt or innocence."l83
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have quoted this same language in
applying the doctrine. 184 Thus, the abatement doctrine seeks to
prevent wrongful convictions by giving the deceased defendant the
benefit of the doubt in his unexhausted appeals. If anything, this
concern mitigates in favor of allowing posthumous exonerations.
Indeed, these jurisdictions' willingness to posthumously vacate
convictions on the chance-sometimes unaccompanied by any direct
evidence 18 5-that an appeal might ultimately have undermined that
conviction suggests that they should also be willing to consider cases
where there is strong evidence that a conviction was factually invalid,
even where the defendant is no longer alive.
181 See Rosanna Cavallaro, Better Off Dead: Abatement, Innocence, and the Evolving Right
ofAppeal, 73 U. CoLO. L. REV. 943, 945-46 (2002). Cavallaro argues that although "[aippeal of
a criminal conviction is not constitutionally compelled,"
[a]n often unstated premise underlies the remedy of abatement ab initio: that
appellate review of a conviction is so integral to the array of procedural safeguards
due a criminal defendant that incapacity to obtain such review nullifies the jury
verdict. No other rationale explains the reversal that occurs through abatement ab
initio.
Id.
182 Parsons, 367 F.3d at 413.
183Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d at 128 (alterations in original) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 18 (1956)).
14See Parsons, 367 F.3d at 413-14; Oberlin, 718 F.2d at 896.
85 See, e.g., Cavallaro, supra note 181, at 944 (recognizing that abatement applies even in
situations where "[n]othing about [the] defense at trial or on appeal had suggested [that a
defendant] was innocent of the crimes charged").
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Moreover, under the abatement doctrine, the courts reason that the
conviction, which could never be fully appealed as a result of the
death of the convicted, may unjustly leave a permanent black mark on
the defendant's reputation. The Fifth Circuit, for example, observes
that "arguably the family [of the deceased convicted] is comforted by
restoration of the decedent's 'good name"' 8 6 through abatement. The
Louisiana Supreme Court has similarly found:
[T]he surviving family has an interest in preserving,
unstained, the memory of the deceased defendant or his
reputation. This interest is of sufficient legal significance to
require that a judgment of conviction not be permitted to
become a final and definitive judgment of record when its
validity or correctness has not been finally determined
because the defendant's death has caused a pending appeal to
be dismissed.187
Posthumous exonerations address this same fundamental concern
in cases where there is strong evidence that the stain from
"final convictions"-not just unappealed or incompletely appealed
convictions-may be unwarranted. Thus, although the abatement
doctrine, on its face, would appear to cut against conducting
posthumous exonerations, the policy underlying the abatement
doctrine supports allowing them.
Some authors, however, believe that the abatement doctrine may
be weakening.' 88 Several state courts-recognizing the interests of the
defendant's family and the public in a full adjudication of the
defendant's guilt-have taken a different route, refusing to
automatically vacate convictions but allowing appeals to continue
after a defendant's death. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for
example, after an appellant died pending the outcome of an appeal,
stated that "it is in the interest of both a defendant's estate and society
that any challenge initiated by a defendant to the regularity or
constitutionality of a criminal proceeding be fully reviewed and
8 United States v. Pauline, 625 F.2d 684, 684-85 (5th Cir. 1980).
187 State v. Morris, 328 So. 2d 65, 67 (La. 1976).
18 See Russell P. Butler, What Practitioners and Judges Need to Know Regarding Crime
Victims' Participatory Rights in Federal Sentencing Proceedings, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 21, 22
(2006) (citing State v. Korsen, 111 P.3d 130 (Idaho 2005)) (arguing that "[tihe direction to treat
victims with fairness is already affecting state criminal justice jurisprudence" and citing the
"abrogation of the abatement ab initio doctrine" as an example of this trend); see also Cavallaro,
supra note 181, at 943, 958 (arguing that the doctrine is strong, since it exists in a "plurality" of
states and eleven out of the twelve circuits, but observing that "[in recent years ... there has
been some resistance to the remedy of abatement").
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decided by the appellate process." 89 Wisconsin has determined that
the defendant is neither entitled to abatement of the criminal
proceedings ab initio nor barred from pursuing an appeal.' 90
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court, in reasoning that reflects the
needs expressed by families and concerned members of communities
in posthumous exonerations, has observed:
Oftentimes rights other than those of an individual defendant
are involved. . . . The family of the defendant and the public
have an interest in the final determination of a criminal
case." 91 Kansas has at least "twice reviewed criminal
proceedings after the death of the defendant-appellant, in
order to determine the liability of the decedent's estate for
costs of prosecution.192
In rejecting the abatement doctrine, these courts have thus
focused on the collateral consequences of criminal convictions. This
reasoning also supports allowing posthumous exoneration, as these
consequences are no less serious after the appellate process is
complete.
On the other hand, several state courts rejecting the abatement
doctrine have not been swayed either by the possibility of innocence
prior to the completion of the appellate process or by the familial and
societal interest in a complete adjudication.193 These states dismiss the
appeal upon the death of a defendant but refuse to vacate the
conviction, citing a need for finality and a faith in the accuracy of
a conviction even where there was no opportunity for appeal.194
These arguments for finality, which reason that "it is better policy
to allow the litigation to end and the presumptively valid conviction
to stand than it is to allow the convicted defendant's survivors to
189 Commonwealth v. Walker, 288 A.2d 741, 742 (Pa. 1972).
19"See State v. McDonald, 424 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Wis. 1988) (holding that "when a
defendant dies while pursuing postconviction relief, irrespective of the cause of death, ... the
defendant's right to an appeal continues," but that a defendant is not "entitled to have the
criminal proceedings abated ab initio").
" State v. Jones, 551 P.2d 801, 804 (Kan. 1976).
192 Id. at 803.
19 See, e.g., State v. Clements, 668 So. 2d 980, 981-82 (Fla. 1996) (holding that "the
death of the defendant does not extinguish a presumably correct conviction and restore the
presumption of innocence which the conviction overcame"); People v. Peters, 537 N.W.2d 160,
163 (Mich. 1995) (finding it inappropriate to abate the conviction of a deceased defendant on
the ground that conviction destroys the presumption of innocence regardless of the right to
appeal).
194 See Clements, 668 So. 2d at 981-82; Peters, 537 N.W.2d at 163-64; see also Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (noting that the burden of showing a right to prove "actual
innocence" post-conviction is very high due to the disruptive effect of such claims on the need
for finality in capital cases).
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pursue litigation ad infinitum, in an effort to clear the deceased
defendant's name,"'9 5 cut equally against posthumous exonerations
and abatement. The finality argument, however, loses some of its
force when DNA or other similarly conclusive evidence of innocence
is available. Regardless, posthumous exonerations should be allowed
even in jurisdictions that do not follow the abatement doctrine. As
will be argued in Part III, the value of posthumous exonerations to
the effort to address the causes of wrongful conviction merits
conducting them even if the need for justice in the individual case is
deemed not to.
III. POSTHUMOUs EXONERATIONS AND THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT:
DNA, INNOCENCE COMMISSIONS, AND THE SEARCH FOR THE
UNDERLYING CAUSES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
The debate surrounding the abatement doctrine and its alternatives
weighs concerns about avoiding injustice in the individual case
against society's need for finality, and jurisdictions have not all read
the scales the same way. There is an additional factor in favor of
allowing posthumous exonerations: all exonerations are a valuable
resource, providing critical raw material for the study of the causes of
wrongful conviction, a crucial part of the effort to reform the criminal
justice system to prevent further such convictions.
Exonerations have occurred for centuries,' 96 but only with the
advent of DNA technology have individuals widely been able to
prove, based on scientific testing, that they are factually innocent of
the crimes for which they have been charged or convicted. This flood
of definitive exonerations, in cases that previously lacked the benefit
of DNA testing, has led to a broad-based campaign for reform. As
cases proving that innocent defendants have been convicted and
incarcerated for crimes that they did not commit have piled up, some
states have created innocence commissions to attempt to address these
alarming failures of the criminal justice system by identifying and
eliminating their root causes.
Where innocence commissions exist, they need wrongful
convictions to study, and posthumous exonerations-regardless of
whether they are accompanied by judicial fact-finding-produce this
scarce resource. In the many jurisdictions without these commissions,
' Peters, 537 N.W.2d at 163-64.
'9See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. at 412, 414 (noting, in the context of exoneration through
clemency, that "[i]n England, the clemency power was vested in the Crown and can be traced




however, judicial fact-finding in both posthumous and traditional
exonerations may be a useful alternative. 97
A. Valuable Data Points from a Small DNA Window
The innocence movement is not new, but it has changed over time
as forensic techniques, judicial procedures, politics, and societal
perceptions of justice have evolved. Bruce Smith notes that "[i]n
the early decades of the twentieth century, America witnessed a
period of sustained interest in the issues of wrongful conviction and
wrongful execution," when the American Prison Congress conducted
a one-year investigation of wrongful executions in American
history.198 After surveying prison wardens to determine whether they
had any "personal knowledge" of wrongful executions, the Congress
concluded (perhaps unsurprisingly) that it had not identified any
wrongful executions in American history. 199 Smith observes that the
movement became more serious upon the 1932 publication of Yale
Law professor Edwin Borchard's Convicting the Innocent: Errors in
Criminal Justice, a book similar in content and tone to some of the
innocence commission reports published today. Convicting the
Innocent discussed sixty-five wrongful convictions from England and
America and described their underlying causes, such as erroneous
eyewitness testimony and false confessions. 201
More widespread public recognition of wrongful convictions did
not begin until during and after the civil rights era, when cases of
African-American defendants accused of raping and murdering white
women were critically reviewed. Clarence Norris, for example, one of
the nine African-American "Scottsboro Boys" convicted for the rape
of Ruby Bates in a train car in Alabama in 1931, was pardoned by
Alabama in 1976, long after it was discovered that the rape story was
false.2 02 He was the only surviving defendant and the only one of the
nine to be pardoned.203
Smith, however, pinpoints the "true" start of the modem innocence
movement at 1987,204 when Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet
'
97 See infra Part IV.
98 Bruce P. Smith, The History of Wrongful Execution, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1185, 1215
(2005).
1 Id.
20o See id. at 1216.
201 Id. (citing EDWIN BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, at xiii (1932)).
202 MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOus CONVICTIONS IN
CAPITAL CASES 116-18 (1992).
203 Id. at 118.
20 4Smith, supra note 198, at 1216.
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published data on wrongful convictions, which one of the
authors had begun collecting twenty years earlier.205 The authors
searched the New York Times Index, libraries, and archives;
published announcements regarding their research in attorneys' and
criminologists' newsletters; and surveyed nearly every state governor
to try to identify cases and their causes.206 They ultimately identified
350 caseS207 and catalogued the type of actions-either state-based,
such as executive pardons, or unofficial, such as another person
confessing to the crime or later scholarly research-that proved that
"defendants convicted of capital or potentially capital crimes" were
innocent.208 They also described and characterized the causes of
wrongful conviction in each case.209 This type of investigation into
wrongful convictions was soon to become easier, however, and to
spur a nationwide innocence litigation movement, with the advent of
the first DNA-based exoneration.
Since 1989, when a DNA test confirmed that Gary Dotson,
convicted of rape ten years earlier and sentenced to twenty-five to
210fifty years in prison, had not committed the crime, the rate of
exonerations and the attention paid to the causes of the wrongful
convictions leading to these exonerations have drastically increased.
Although there was only one other DNA exoneration in 1989
(following Dotson's pioneering exoneration), and there was only an
average of between one and six per year through 1995,211 the average
from 2000 to 2009 was eighteen, with some years in this period
212producing as many as twenty-four exonerations. Exonerations
based on DNA evidence213 are particularly useful to the study of
wrongful convictions, as they typically produce a much higher degree
of certainty of the defendant's innocence than is possible through
most conventional means,214 and "there is no reason to think that the
20 5 See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 25 (1987) (noting that the first list of death penalty cases
involving miscarriages of justice was not published until 1964).
206 See id. at 27-28.
20 7 Id. at 23, 48.
208 Id. at 23-24.
209 See id. at 56-64 & 57 tbl.6.210 See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 4, at 4-5 (describing Dotson's case and the DNA
tests).
2 11 Gross et al., supra note 1, at 527.
21z See Innocence Project, supra note 45. In 2002, twenty-four wrongfully convicted
defendants were exonerated. Id.
213 It is likely that most posthumous exonerations will be based on DNA evidence or other
similarly hard proof, as it is difficult to build a case with a dead defendant and, as argued later,
parties will not likely wish to invest the resources to seek an exoneration unless they are
reasonably certain the conviction was wrongful.
214 As one scholar put it, "[ulnlike the many other cases where one group of human beings
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documented factors that initially led to the wrongful convictions in
those cases later unraveled by DNA" will appear less frequently in the
non-DNA cases.215 As Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld have
observed, "Courts, scholars, and policy makers are all beginning
to recognize that the most important aspect of the wave of
post-conviction DNA exonerations is what it can teach us about all
the other cases (the vast majority) where DNA testing is not
available."2 16 These exonerations largely exist within a limited
window in time, however, as they most commonly result from
convictions obtained prior to the availability or refinement of DNA
testing.2 17 As D. Michael Risinger has explained:
As DNA technology has become more sensitive, more
accurate, and more generally available and understood,
the number of cases in which such testing is not done for
the original trial shrinks. . . . Those who are guilty in the
relatively small percentage of cases where DNA evidence is
available will be convicted with much greater confidence, and
those who can be exonerated by DNA will be exonerated
before or at trial.2 18
The small size of this window means that every case matters, and-as
demonstrated by the posthumous exonerations that have already
occurred-exonerable defendants from this time period can and
do die before proving their innocence.219 Without posthumous
(e.g., appellate judges) overrule the decisions of another group of human beings (e.g., trial
judges, juries, etc.), DNA exonerations are cloaked in scientific certainty." Michael Rowan,
Comment, Minding Our Skepticism: A Conservative Approach to Capital Punishment, 31 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 377, 401 (2004).
215Daniel S. Medwed, Essay, Innocentrism, 2008 U. IL. L. REV. 1549, 1571. DNA, of
course, has not eliminated wrongful convictions, as eighty to ninety percent of criminal cases do
not have the benefit of biological evidence. Id. As Medwed has argued, DNA is not a "vaccine
to injustice." Id. at 1570. Despite the advances in DNA technology, which will help to prevent
wrongful convictions in the few cases where biological evidence is available, "the conditions
that cause wrongful conviction in non-DNA cases-the vast majority of cases-remain
unaffected by this development," and, as Risinger has argued, "[w]e must use the
post-conviction DNA exonerations wisely to throw light on the more general problem."
Risinger, supra note 36, at 773.
216 Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neufeld, Toward the Formation of "Innocence
Commissions" in America, 86 JUDICATURE 98, 101 (2002).
217 Michael J. Saks et al., Toward a Model Act for the Prevention and Remedy of
Erroneous Convictions, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 669, 670 (2001) ("In cases where DNA typing
can be performed it will routinely be performed, and the post-conviction DNA exoneration
cases that today are almost commonplace will disappear.").
218 Risinger, supra note 36, at 772-73.219 See discussion supra Part I.
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exoneration, the lessons that could be gleaned from their misfortunes
die with them.
Further, increasing the number of exonerations available for study
is particularly important because the existing dataset is rather small.
The study by Michael Radelet and Hugo Bedau, introduced above,2 20
and now including ten more years of exoneration cases, identified 350
defendants that the authors "believed had been wrongfully convicted
in capital (or potentially capital) cases in the period from 1900 to
1985." The authors later updated the inventory through 1991, adding
sixty-six more cases to this list 22 1 for a total of 416 "wrong-person
convictions," which they define as involving "official judgments of
error" and "unofficial judgments" that are sufficiently conclusive as
to indicate innocence. 222 Studies that include non-capital exonerations
involve similarly small data sets. In 1987, for example, Samuel Gross
described all known eyewitness misidentifications that had led to the
"conviction of innocent people," which totaled only ninety-seven.223
Although the low numbers could simply suggest that there are few
wrongful convictions, this is not the consensus in the literature, which
points to the difficulty of identifying wrongful convictions as a
contributing factor to the low total.224 Even the most comprehensive
and sophisticated studies available have been forced to rely on
secondary sources. As Gross explains in describing the methodology
of one of the most thorough DNA exoneration studies to date:
There is no national registry of exonerations, or any simple
way to tell from official records which dismissals, pardons,
etc., are based on innocence. As a result, we learned about
many of the cases in our database from media reports. But the
220 See RADELET ET AL., supra note 202.
221 Id. at ix-x.
22 2 Id. at 17. In the authors' view, sufficiently conclusive evidence of innocence, though
based on "unofficial judgments," includes a confession by the "real culprit"; a determination
that the crime never took place; a conclusion by a state official-following investigation-that
"the convicted defendant really is innocent," despite an extrajudicial official never coming to
the innocent's aid; and a conclusion by the defendant's attorney or family, based on "crucial
evidence," that the defendant is innocent. Id. This study counts more cases than are typically
included in exoneration research, since it encompasses cases where family members or the
attorney find "crucial evidence" of the innocence of the defendant but cannot convince an
official institution to declare such innocence." Id. Samuel Gross only includes cases where there
is an official determination of innocence by a prosecutor, executive, or judge. See Gross, supra
note 40, at 412.
223 Gross, supra note 40, at 413 (ninety-seven of the misidentification cases resulted
in convictions; thirty-nine additional cases did not). Gross was only concerned with
misidentifications that led to "the conviction of innocent people." Id. at 396.
224 For example, Gross et al. conclude that "it is certain ... that many defendants ... no
doubt thousands, have been falsely convicted of serious crimes but have not been exonerated."
Gross et al., supra note 1, at 527.
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media inevitably miss some cases-and we, no doubt, have
missed some cases that were reported.225
Because of the paucity of known exonerations and the challenge of
locating new ones, each new point added to the set, including an
exoneration of a wrongful conviction after death, adds meaningfully
to the available information on wrongful convictions. As Anne-Marie
Moyes has argued in the capital context:
If the public is to assess properly the reliability of its
capital punishment system, and any potential corruption
within that system, it must have access to information in
the government's control. . . . If the electorate is to have an
informed debate about the appropriateness of the death
penalty, it must have full access to information, and this
access should include the ability to posthumously test DNA
evidence in the state's custody.226
The limited number of cases containing biological evidence, which
could not be tested at trial but was sufficiently preserved to allow for
post-1989 testing, makes each additional case valuable to both the
public and the individual exonerated.
B. The Need for Findings: The Gap Left by Existing Exoneration
Procedures
Merely cataloguing wrongful convictions does not reveal their
causes, and existing methods of exoneration have largely failed to
conduct this sort of inquiry. This need has been filled, in some
states, by the creation of innocence commissions. Some posthumous
exonerations have also inspired other reforms, perhaps because the
public is particularly incensed by the knowledge that a defendant
has died before he can enjoy his freedom.227 Following Timothy
Cole's posthumous exoneration, for example, the Texas Legislature
created a blue-ribbon panel, the "Tim Cole Advisory Panel on
Wrongful Convictions," to recommend procedural safeguards in
25 Id. at 525.
22 6 Anne-Marie Moyes, Note, Assessing the Risk of Executing the Innocent: A Case for
Allowing Access to Physical Evidence for Posthumous DNA Testing, 55 VAND. L. REv. 953,
987 (2002).
227 See, e.g., Alisa LaPolt & Marjorie Menzel, Lawmakers Look at Bill to Ease Inmate
Access to DNA Tests, FLA. TODAY, Apr. 18, 2001, at 1. In reference to Frank Lee Smith's death
of cancer in prison before he could be exonerated, one member of a Catholic, anti-death penalty
group stated: "It was such a blatant injustice.... He died a horrible death, and he was not
guilty." Id.
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criminal cases. 22 8 Frank Lee Smith's posthumous exoneration in
2000 in Florida similarly "prompted" the Florida Legislature 22 9 to
pass a bill providing access to "postsentencing DNA testing."230
Despite these sporadic efforts, inspired by posthumous
exonerations, to improve findings and make evidence accessible in
post-conviction innocence cases, existing procedures for exonerations
fail to consistently produce useful findings that can serve as lessons
for meaningful, systemic reform. Authors have generally not studied
the content of exonerations (the findings made in the judicial order,
executive decree, or similar document officially exonerating the
individual) but have focused instead on the number and types of
exonerations that have occurred,2 3 1 the causes of the wrongful
convictions leading to the exoneration,232 and the reforms that should
be implemented to reduce the wrongful conviction rate.233 Several,
however, have noted the dearth of specific findings about the causes
of wrongful conviction cases. Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld, for
example, observe:
Although these cases ["110 post-conviction DNA
exonerations .. . in the 10 years preceding September 1,
2002"] all involve convictions on serious felony charges that
were affirmed on direct appeal, and often upheld after
post-conviction proceedings in both state and federal courts,
there has never been a detailed opinion written about what
went wrong in any of these cases, much less an analysis
offering suggestions on what could be done to prevent similar
-234
miscarriages of justice.
The authors note that, instead of preparing a written opinion about the
causes or suggesting reforms, officials follow a cursory procedure:
228 See Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense, Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful
Convictions, http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tfid/tcap.asp (last visited June 2, 2010).229 See Marc Caputo, Bill Would Offer Inmates DNA Tests, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 23,
2001, at 10A (describing the Florida House companion bill to Florida Senate Bill 366 allowing
inmates access to DNA tests to prove their innocence).
230 S. 366, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 925.11 (2006)).
231 See, e.g., Bedau & Radelet, supra note 205 (documenting 350 cases of capital
defendants later found innocent).
232 See, e.g., Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 4, passim (examining forensic testimony during
the trials of innocent convicted persons); Gross, supra note 40, at 398-402 (examining the
problems associated with eyewitness identifications).
233 See, e.g., Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 216 (proposing the creation of "innocence
commissions" to investigate errors in the criminal justice system).23 4 Id. at 98-99.
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[T]he exculpatory DNA results are received, an order
vacating the conviction (or a gubernatorial pardon) is issued,
and, in a few cases, the judge or the governor offers an
apology. To confound matters further, many, but by no means
all, of the public officials who should be most concerned
about the underlying causes of such wrongful convictions
blithely proclaim that the "system has worked" and
assiduously avoid the suggestion there is anything further to
investigate. Those officials who want to get to the root
of these problems do not have an independent body to
which they can turn for further investigation or policy
235
recommendations.
Keith Findley, like Scheck and Neufeld, bemoans the lack of
a consistent, formal procedure for exoneration, observing that
"ordinarily no inquiry is made into the causes of the error. Often, the
order setting aside the conviction is a one-line order entered in the
trial court."236 Although an appellate court "occasionally" recognizes
and discusses the errors, he notes, "almost never is there a searching
inquiry to determine what led to the errors, and how they can be
prevented in the future."2 37 He views this not only as a problem for
the individual case, as it prevents a thorough examination of the
causes of wrongful conviction, but also as a community-wide
concern, since it stymies attempts to identify common flaws in the
238
criminal justice system.
Indeed, the typical limited-finding exoneration is problematic
because it does little to aid the effort to prevent future, similar errors.
Manuel Utset argues that "a sequence of nonmaterial errors can lead
to a wrongful conviction" and that these types of errors are
particularly difficult to identify.239 Only detailed findings, describing
the many events in the case from the beginning of the investigation,
can produce the nuanced data that- can potentially reveal the
non-obvious, "cumulative errors"240 that may lead to a wrongful
conviction. Yet it appears that most exonerations (of living
defendants) create few, if any, findings about the causes of a wrongful
conviction, despite the gravity of the judicial error that has occurred.
23 5 Id. at 99 (footnote omitted).
236 Keith A. Findley, Learning From Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to
Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REv. 333, 339 (2002).
237 Id.
2 38 See id. at 338.239 Manuel A. Utset, Telling Differences: Observational Equivalence and Wrongful
Convictions, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 49, 53.
240 Id. at 88.
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Pardons, for example, which offer little to no explanation of
the procedural or substantive errors underlying wrongful convictions
are a historically common form of exoneration, 24 1 although their
frequency has substantially declined in recent years, and they
are now "rarely granted." 24 2 State pardons based on evidence
of innocence-what this Article will refer to as "innocence
pardons" 243-are typically issued by the governor as authorized by the
state constitution or courts,244 or by boards with clemency-granting
241 Pardons are a form of clemency. SAMUEL P. STAFFORD II, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, CLEMENCY: LEGAL AUTHORITY, PROCEDURE, AND STRUCTURE xiii (1977). Clemency
also includes "commutation of sentence, reprieve, or remission of fines and forfeitures." Id.
Pardons are the only type of clemency that offer true exoneration, since only a pardon (provided
it is a full pardon) relieves the offender of all guilt and the punishment associated with that guilt.
See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 126, at 5 (distinguishing pardons from the reprieve, which
"postpones execution of the sentence for a specified period of time," and the commutation,
where "punishment takes place, but in a reduced form").
242 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 23, at 486. Exonerations still, however, comprise a
substantial number of exonerations of falsely convicted defendants, making up thirteen percent
of all exonerations between 1989 and 2003 identified in the Gross study. Gross et al., supra note
1, at 1 (explaining that 42 of the 328 exonerations of falsely convicted defendants identified in
the study involved cases where "governors (or other appropriate executive officers) issued
pardons based on evidence of the defendants' innocence").
243 Innocence pardons can be distinguished from those granted on alternate grounds, such
as political or merciful pardons. See, e.g., James D. Barnett, The Grounds of Pardon, 17 AM.
INST. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 490, 492 (1927) (describing how former Arkansas Governor
Jeff Davis "pardoned an average of one convict a day during his term of six years," explaining
that if he "did not show mercy, . . . [he] would not expect mercy when. . . [he] bow[e]d] before
the judgment seat"); William Glaberson, States' Pardons Now Looked at in Starker Light,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at Al (discussing Wisconsin Republican Governor Tommy G.
Thompson's pardon of the son of a Republican state senator, who had previously been convicted
of cocaine possession, and how New Jersey Governor Christie Whitman pardoned "the aunt of
the director of the casino commission's division of licensing," who had been "convicted on
gambling charges").
244 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. V, § 124 ("The governor shall have power to grant reprieves
and commutations to persons under sentence of death."); CAL. CONST. art. 5, § 8(a) ("Subject to
application procedures provided by statute, the Governor, on conditions the Governor deems
proper, may grant a reprieve, pardon, and commutation, after sentence, except in case of
impeachment.... The Governor may not grant a pardon or commutation to a person twice
convicted of a felony except on recommendation of the Supreme Court, 4 judges concurring.");
COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 7 ("The governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason . . . ."); FLA. CONST. art. 4, § 8(a)
("Except in cases of treason and . . . impeachment [that] results in conviction, the governor may
... with the approval of two members of the cabinet, grant full or conditional pardons, restore
civil rights, commute punishment, and remit fines and forfeitures for offenses."); ILL. CONST.
art. V, § 12 ("The Governor may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction,
for all offenses on such terms as he thinks proper. The manner of applying therefore may be
regulated by law."); R.I. CONST. art. 9, § 134 (The governor, by and with the advice and consent
of the senate, shall hereafter exclusively exercise the pardoning power, except in cases of
impeachment, to the same extent as such power is now exercised by the general assembly.").
There are several reent examples of pardons by state governors. In 1980, four Illinois
men were convicted of quadruple murder in Illinois. A state police investigation identified the
real killers and found three witnesses who confirmed the men's innocence. See RADELET ET AL.,
supra note 202, at 283-84. In 1991, Illinois Governor Jim Edgar pardoned the men, although the
pardon was accompanied by his statement that it was "not because I'm saying they're innocent."
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authority.24 5 These commonly occur with no associated judicial
intervention, though pardons are sometimes granted prior to or
following a court's declaration of innocence.6
Another long-followed method of exoneration is for the
prosecution to indicate that it will not continue to press charges, either
by explicitly dropping the charges, dismissing the indictment, joining
in the defendant's motion for a new trial, or agreeing to or failing to
respond to a defendant's motion in court to dismiss all charges.
Arroyo Miguel, for example, was convicted of manslaughter in New
York in 1965. Witnesses who supported the prosecution's original
case against Arroyo later testified that they had seen another man kill
the victim and recanted their initial testimony, leading to the
248
subsequent arrest and indictment of the other man. After the
trial judge set aside Arroyo's original conviction, the prosecution
dismissed the indictment against him.249 Similarly, Craig Bell was
convicted by a jury of second-degree murder in Virginia in 1987.
Two months later, after another man confessed to the crime, the
prosecution dropped the charges against Bell and a judge released
him. 250 And as described in Part I, the prosecution in the Salvati Four
case supported the defendants' motion for a new trial and a stay of the
Id. at 284 (internal quotations omitted). In 1993, Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder issued an
executive order for clemency in Walter Snyder's case after DNA evidence showed that he had
not committed the rape he was convicted for and the Commonwealth's Attorney had requested
clemency. See INNOCENCE COMM'N FOR VA., supra note 42, at 19. Later, in 2003, Governor
Mark Warner of Virginia pardoned Julius Ruffin twenty-one years after his arrest. Ruffin had
successfully obtained a court order for DNA testing under Virginia's then-new DNA testing
statute, and the tests verified that another individual-already in prison-had committed the
crime. Id. at 18. In one of the most recent examples, in 2008, Illinois Governor George Ryan
pardoned four men, convicted of rape and murder in 1986, who were proven innocent by DNA.
See Jodi Wilgoren, Illinois: Governor Pardons for 4 Cleared by DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18,
2002, at A21.
245 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-22-20 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) (describing the Alabama
Board of Pardons and Paroles); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §213.010 (LexisNexis 2005) (describing
the Nevada pardon board).
24 See, e.g., HUFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 19 (describing the case of Johnny Binder, in
which a court released Binder from prison after another individual confessed to the crime for
which he had been convicted, and the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles then recommended a
full pardon); see also text accompanying supra note 80 (describing Texas Governor Rick
Perry's posthumous pardon of Timothy Cole following a court of inquiry's determination of
Cole's innocence).
247 See, e.g., Matt Burgard, His Challenge Now: Freedom, HARTFORD COURANT, July 12,
2006, at Al (discussing James Tillman's exoneration, in which the prosecutor stated in court
that Connecticut would not seek a new trial and the superior court then formally dismissed all
charges).
248 See RADELET ET AL., supra note 202, at 283.
249 Id.
250 See id. at 286.
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execution of Limone's sentence.251 Later, through a motion nolle
prosequi, the prosecution indicated to the court that it would not
further prosecute the case, although it never formally dropped the
charges.25 2
Occasionally, when prosecutors use a passive technique such as
dropped charges to remedy a wrongful conviction, their motions or
public statements provide some evidence, although sparse, of the
causes underlying the wrongful conviction, or at least provide a form
of apology to the family. These offer little in terms of concrete
findings, however. In the Suffolk District Attorney's 2004 motion to
posthumously drop all charges in Louis Greco's case, the motion
included reasons of "legal and ethical considerations raised by the
newly discovered FBI documents, as well as principles of consistency
and fundamental fairness," as discussed above.253 On the other hand,
prosecutors frequently refuse to concede any wrongdoing even when
they request the dismissal of charges. 254
Even when courts ultimately and officially issue an exoneration for
a living or deceased defendant, they do not often provide a detailed
analysis of what went wrong. This is true regardless of whether the
exoneration is in the form of a vacation of the conviction and a new
trial,255 a reversal and remand for new trial with a directed verdict of
acquittal, a dismissed indictment,256 or an acquittal at the end of a new
trial (all of which must involve some clear indication of innocence to
count as an exoneration here).257 In the Salvati Four case, for
example, while the court vacated the convictions and ordered the
release of those who were still alive and in prison, there is no
indication that the court did anything more than strongly chastise the
251 See Wells, supra note 99.
252 Lawrence, Men Jailed, supra note 100.
253 Lawrence, Suffolk DA, supra note 109.
254 See, e.g., Gross et al., supra note 1, at 525-26 (discussing prosecutors' statements upon
dismissal of charges in exoneration cases, wherein they suggested that their actions did not
mean that the defendant was innocent of the crime).
255See, e.g., INNOCENCE COMM'N FOR VA. supra note 42, at 14 (discussing how the
"Commonwealth's Attorney petitioned the court to set aside [Craig] Bell's conviction" after
another individual confessed).
256 See, e.g., id. at 15 (discussing the drawn-out exoneration process for Jeffrey Cox,
wherein, following the acceptance by the Virginia Supreme Court of Cox's habeas appeal, "the
Virginia Attorney General's office reached a settlement with Cox's attorneys in which the
Commonwealth agreed that the writ should be granted, the convictions vacated, and Cox should
be released from prison," after which the court "acted accordingly and dismissed the original
indictment").
257 Major studies of exonerations of innocent defendants exclude defendants acquitted
due to "insufficient evidence of identity or ... improper use of suggestive identification
procedures." Gross, supra note 40, at 412; see also HUFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 11
(explaining that there is a "significant difference between being found 'not guilty' according to
the standards of our legal system and establishing complete innocence").
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FBI agents who, it appeared, had knowingly produced perjured
testimony in the case.25 8 In Frank Smith's case, the exoneration came
in the form of a one-page order simply stating:
THIS CAUSE having come before this Court upon State's
Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judgments and Sentences,
and this Court having considered same, hereby GRANTS the
State's Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judgments and
Sentences, based upon newly discovered DNA evidence.259
Other cases involving acquittal on retrial, which do not all fit within
this Article's definition of an exoneration because they are based
on claims of procedural error as opposed to, or in addition to,
actual innocence, 2 60 also offer limited discussion of errors in the
investigative and prosecutorial process.26 1
Unlike pardons or prosecutorial actions, post-exoneration claims
for damages sometimes do produce findings of what went wrong.
Claims filed under 18 U.S.C. § 1983, of course, can reveal
constitutional violations leading to wrongful convictions. For
example, Herman Atkins, who was exonerated eight years after his
conviction as a result of DNA testing,262 brought a § 1983 claim after
his release, alleging the investigation leading to his conviction
258 See J.M. Lawrence, Second Man Exonerated in 1965 Mob Killing Case, BOSTON
HERALD, Jan. 19, 2001, at 2 (noting the judge's remarks that "[t]he conduct of certain agents of
the bureau ... stains the legacy of the FBr').
259 Florida v. Smith, No. 85-4654 CFl0A (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 22, 2000) (on file with
author).
2600ther authors follow a similar definition, which excludes acquittals on procedural
grounds. See supra notes 39, 41 and accompanying text.
261 Some cases that only count as exonerations under Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam's
definition (because they are based on insufficient evidence or other constitutional infirmities
rather than factual innocence) have produced somewhat more detailed findings about the
problems in the process. See, e.g., RADELET ET AL., supra note 202, at 297. In Cox v. State, for
example, the Florida Supreme Court vacated a defendant's sentence, reversed the conviction,
and remanded with a directed order of acquittal. 555 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. 1989) (per curiam).
In so doing, the court outlined-albeit briefly-some of the prosecutorial problems in the case.
See id. (citing insufficient evidence as the primary reason for the court's holding). The court
observed that the evidence relied upon was questionable, explaining that "hair analysis and
comparison are not absolutely certain and reliable" and that "[a]lthough a serologist testified
that Cox has type 0 blood, he also testified that forty-five percent of the world's population has
type 0 blood." Id. As discussed earlier, however, these acquittals are not true exonerations
because they do not declare an individual to be innocent of the crime charged or dismiss the
charges. As Samuel Gross explains, "[a]cquittals and reversals are not usually based on
affirmative findings of innocence but rather on deficient evidence of guilt, and they do not
necessarily dissipate the suspicion against an accused person." Gross, supra note 40, at 412.
Thus, it is impossible to be sure that any errors discussed by the court led to a genuinely
wrongful conviction.
262 Atkins v. County of Riverside, 151 F. App'x 501, 503 (9th Cir. 2005).
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violated his due process rights.263 In partially reversing the district
court's denial of relief,2 64 the Ninth Circuit made detailed findings
about the errors in the investigation, holding that "[t]here is a 'clearly
established' due process right not to be subjected to criminal
charges on the basis of deliberately fabricated false evidence by
the government," 26 5 and observing that because a "fabricated
conversation" may have been included in a police report, "a factual
question remains whether Atkins was subjected to criminal
charges 'on the basis of deliberately fabricated evidence."2 66 By their
nature, however, § 1983 claims reach only constitutional violations,
the potential of which to lead to wrongful convictions is generally
well-established.
Tort-based claims arising from a previous determination of
innocence may be more useful in producing the needed findings. This
is true because the judge, in assessing the damages question, is
likely to carefully describe the harms underlying the damages. For
example, the district court's opinion in the Salvati Four tort case is
more than 100 pages long, and it tells a detailed story of the many
wrongs that led to Tameleo's and Greco's erroneous conviction and
267imprisonment, recounting every stage of the case with minute
268
precision and focusing on the FBI's many missteps.
In total, while a smattering of exonerations, and the civil cases
that sometimes follow, offer occasional insights into errors in the
prosecutorial process, they fail to consistently include such findings
and almost never do so comprehensively. As a result of this failure
and in pursuit of concrete recommendations for reform, some states
have created innocence commissions of various types.
C. The Response in Some States: Innocence Commissions
In response to the need for investigation into the causes of
wrongfuil convictions, some states have created an alternative forum
for the generation of such findings: the innocence commission.269
263 Id.
264The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, who included the
county, the county's deputy sheriff, and the California Department of Justice serologist who had
testified in the case. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment on Atkins's fabrication of evidence and Brady claims. Id.265 Id. at 506 (quoting Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (en
banc)).
266 Id.
26 7 See Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. Mass. 2007), affd, 579 F.3d 79
(1st Cir. 2009).
2m See id. at 157-99.
269 Although not implemented, other solutions have been proposed by scholars. One
alternative, for example, is to implement post-conviction investigations at the prosecutorial
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Although innocence commissions specifically tasked with
investigating all wrongful conviction cases are a recent development,
the concept goes further back in history. As early as the 1930s, state
commissions were sometimes appointed to investigate individual
cases with questionable convictions. In Oregon, for example, Jordan
Theodore confessed to first-degree murder and was sentenced to
death in 1932. The only evidence implicating Theodore was his
confession, and he consistently argued that his confession had
been coerced.270 In response to public anger, the state appointed a
"special gubernatorial commission" to "re-investigate the case," and
in 1934, the governor commuted Theodore's sentence to life
imprisonment. 27 1 The conviction was finally set aside and the
indictment was dropped in 1964.272
Modern innocence commissions exist in several forms. Great
Britain has the most formal of such commissions, the Criminal Cases
Review Commission ("CCRC"), which was created by the Criminal
Appeal Act of 1995.273 The CCRC's role is "to consider suspected
miscarriages of justice; to arrange for their investigation where
appropriate; and to refer cases to the Court of Appeal where the
level. See, e.g., Garrett, Innocence, supra note 10, at 1714-15 (noting that "[p]rosecutor's
offices have established internal institutions to review potential wrongful conviction cases"). In
1999, Richard Devine, then the Cook County State's Attorney, promised to "make a
'comprehensive, personal review of evidence and legal proceedings in all death penalty cases
after all appeals have been exhausted and before a petition of clemency is filed with the
governor."' David Horan, The Innocence Commission: An Independent Review Board for
Wrongful Convictions, 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 91, 119 (2000) (quoting Maurice Possley & Christi
Parsons, Devine Vows Closer Look at Death Penalty: New Guidelines To Heighten Prosecutors'
Scrutiny, CI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 1999, at 1). This approach is not amenable to generating
meaningful findings because it relies on those who initially seek convictions to police
themselves, and it presents grave conflict of interest issues. See, e.g., id. at 122 (arguing that
"those who are charged with investigating and prosecuting crimes in the first instance should
not be burdened with the sole institutional responsibility of investigating when they have erred
or suffered a breach from within of their ethical duties to prosecute the guilty and exonerate the
innocent").
Another option for obtaining more detailed findings in exonerations, as well as offering
more opportunities for exoneration, would be to expand the powers of the executive to
investigate innocence and grant clemency. Scholars, however, tend to be skeptical of the
efficacy of this approach, partly due to the vast discretion typically held by the executive under
clemency laws, and they argue that "state governors have simply proven too politically
vulnerable to seriously consider clemency in most capital cases." Id. at 120. Richard Rosen
similarly views clemency as "a political crapshoot that forces the innocent and guilty alike to
rely on popularly elected politicians . . . to ensure that ultimate justice is done." Richard A.
Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REv. 61, 87 (2003).270 RADELET ET AL., supra note 202, at 320.271 Id.
272 Id.273 Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1241, 1276 n.135 (2001).
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investigation reveal[s] matters that ought to be considered further
by the courts."274 The only U.S. innocence commission that fits this
"screen and refer" model is North Carolina's-the North Carolina
Innocence Inquiry Commission-which was established by the
legislature and approved by the governor in 2006.275 This
Commission "investigate[s] and evaluate[s] post-conviction claims of
factual innocence."27 6 Once a claim, which can only be based on new
evidence, is deemed sufficiently strong to merit further study, the
Commission initiates a formal inquiry, notifies the victim, and
conducts a Commission hearing.27 7 If the petitioner in this hearing
(with the assistance of an attorney) introduces "sufficient evidence of
factual innocence to merit judicial review," the Commission then
sends the case to a three-judge panel where the convicted person
"must prove innocence by clear and convincing evidence."278
With the exception of North Carolina,279 most innocence
commissions in the United States do not refer cases to courts but
instead make detailed investigations into the cases of previously
exonerated defendants, determine the causes of these wrongful
convictions, and suggest reforms to prevent future errors. For
example, the Innocence Commission for Virginia, which aims "[t]o
assist in examining the problems that may lead to wrongful
convictions,"280 conducted what it defined as an "independent,
objective, and thorough investigation into eleven wrongful
convictions" in Virginia to complete a 2005 report on wrongful
274 Horan, supra note 269, at 147.
275See Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner's Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to
Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 555 (2008) [hereinafter Medwed,
Dilemma] (noting that North Carolina is "on the cusp" of forming a commission "comparable"
to the CCRC).
276 North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, http://www.innocencecommission
-nc.gov/index.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).277 See The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, Case Progression Through
NCHC Process, http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/Flowchart.htm (last visited Mar. 20,
2010).
278 Id.
279 The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission is unique in this regard:
The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, which received legislative and
gubernatorial approval in the summer of 2006, is entrusted with the duty of assessing
claims of innocence predicated on new evidence unavailable at the time of trial. If a
majority of the proposed eight-member committee (consisting of, inter alia, a judge,
prosecutor, and defense lawyer) considers a case sufficiently credible, the state's
chief justice would be obligated to appoint three judges to review it. Only a
unanimous finding of "clear and convincing evidence" of innocence by those three
judges would generate a reversal of the conviction.
Medwed, Dilemma, supra note 275, at 555 (footnotes omitted).
280 Innocence Commission for Virginia, http://www.icva.us/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
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convictions.28 ' The Commission, which is a collaboration of several
university-led innocence projects, 282 appointed pro bono attorneys
as "case investigators,"283 wrote detailed case reports on Virginia
24innocence cases, 2 and produced final recommendations for avoiding
wrongful convictions. These recommendations include providing
special instructions to witnesses participating in identification
procedures and videotaping of all police interrogations in serious
felony and homicide cases.285
Other commissions take a broader approach under what this
Article describes as a "comprehensive study" model, summarizing
innocence cases from around the country in addition to conducting
case reviews of their own and holding hearings on the causes of
wrongful convictions. Connecticut, for example, established the
Connecticut Advisory Commission on Wrongful Convictions in 2003,
granting the Commission the power to review "any case involving a
wrongful conviction and recommend reforms to lessen the likelihood
of a similar wrongful conviction occurring in the future."286 The
Commission aims "to conduct investigations to determine the cause
or causes of individual cases of wrongful conviction in the State of
Connecticut," to "identify current Connecticut procedures implicated
by causes of wrongful conviction, and to recommend best practices in
the form of procedural, administrative, or statutory changes, or
281 INNOCENCE COMM'N FOR VA., supra note 42, at 3.
28 2See id. at vii (describing the Commission as a collaboration of George Mason
University's Administration of Justice Program, the Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project of
American University's Washington College of Law, and Georgetown University's Constitution
Project).
283 Id. at 4.
28 4 For example, in the case of Marvin Anderson, who was convicted in 1982 for rape
based on an erroneous eyewitness identification, the Commission discussed how a lab expert
had testified that she "blood typed" swabs from Anderson and the victim and could not identify
Anderson as the source of semen in the victim's rape kit. Id. at 13. Anderson also failed to
match the victim's description of the perpetrator. Id. The police, however, arranged a photo
array-in which Anderson's photo was the only color photo-and the victim erroneously
pointed to Anderson. Id. She again erroneously chose Anderson in a live lineup. Id. Ignoring the
conflicting evidence and leads suggesting that another individual with a sexual assault record
may have been the real perpetrator, the police forged ahead and the prosecution obtained a
conviction. Id. Anderson eventually persuaded a county circuit court to order DNA testing,
which confirmed his innocence, and then applied for and received a pardon from the governor.
Id. at 13-14. In another case, in which Earl Washington was convicted of rape and murder and
sentenced to death, the commission noted that Washington, who was later pardoned (with the
exception of the lesser charges) by the governor in 2000 based on DNA testing, did not know
the facts of the crime when he signed his confession. See id. at 21-22.28 5 Id. at 8-12.
286 State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, Advisory Commission on Wrongful Convictions,
Mission Statement, http://www.jud.ct.gov/committees/wrongfulconviction/ (last visited Mar. 20,
2010) [hereinafter Connecticut Advisory Commission Mission Statement].
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education and training." 2 87 It also reviews cases from other states to
help identify the causes of wrongful conviction.2 88
California's Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice,
which completed its investigation and disbanded in 2008,289 similarly
examined wrongful convictions by studying reports from other
innocence commissions and states290 as well as California wrongful
conviction cases.291 As part of the investigative process, it convened a
public hearing where experts, police, concerned citizens, prosecutors,
and criminal defense agencies testified about the causes of wrongful
convictions.2 92 After making these case inquiries and findings,293 the
Commission published recommendations for improving eyewitness
287 Id. At the Commission's meetings, it receives briefings on the details of Connecticut
wrongful conviction cases, such as that of James C. Tillman, who was convicted of rape in 1988
based primarily upon the victim's identification of Tillman in a police photo lineup. Later DNA
testing proved his innocence, and the charges against him were dismissed. See State of
Connecticut Judicial Branch, Advisory Commission on Wrongful Convictions, Meeting Minutes
2 (Nov. 28, 2006), http://www.jud.ct.gov/committees/wrongfulconviction/WF minutes_112
807.pdf; Presentation to the Connecticut Innocence Commission (Nov. 28, 2006),
http://www.jud.ct.gov/committees/wrongfulconviction/Tillman.pdf; see also Burgard, supra
note 247 (explaining Tillman's alleged crime and conviction).
288See Connecticut Advisory Commission Mission Statement, supra note 286 (identifying
as a "[s]pecific Commission objective[]" the goal to "[t]o identify and study the most common
causes of wrongful conviction, both in Connecticut and nationally").289 See California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, http://www.ccfaj.org/
index.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
290See CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING EYE WITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 1-3 (2006), http://www.ccfaj.org/
documents/reports/eyewitness/officialleyewitnessidrep.pdf [hereinafter CCFAJ, EYE WITNESS
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES].
291 See CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING FORENSIC SCIENCE EVIDENCE 4 (2007), http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/
problems/official/OFFICIAL%20REPORT%200N%20FORENSIC%20SCIENCE%20EVIDE
NCE.pdf [hereinafter CCFAJ, FORENSIC SCIENCE EVIDENCE].292 See CCFAJ, EYE WITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES, supra note 290, at 4.
293For example, the Commission observed that in Herman Atkins's case (a DNA-based
exoneration for rape, after Atkins spent more than eight years in prison), Atkins's "defense at
trial was based on mistaken eyewitness identification," and a criminalist from the state
laboratory "improperly testified that Atkins was included in a population of only 4.4% of the
population that could have contributed the semen." CCFAJ, FORENSIC SCIENCE EVIDENCE,
supra note 291, at 4. The report concluded that "[tihe serology data, in fact, was not probative of
guilt or innocence but the jury was nonetheless misled by the state's expert." Id.
In the case of Jeffrey Rodriguez, who spent five years in prison before being exonerated
by DNA evidence, the Commission found:
[A] shaky eyewitness identification was corroborated by the testimony of a
criminalist who claimed his pants contained a stain with a combination of motor oil
and cooking oil. Such a combination would have connected him to the crime scene.
Subsequent tests by a state crime lab concluded that the stain was not as described.
Although at his first trial jurors voted 11-1 to acquit, by the time of his retrial his
family ran out of money, and his lawyer failed even to call the defense witnesses
who had testified at the first trial.
Id.
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testimony, changing policies regarding the use of jailhouse informants
at trial, avoiding false confessions, improving the preservation and
use of scientific evidence, and increasing the accountability of the
294prosecution and defense lawyers. It also made strong arguments for
295
continued funding of university-led innocence projects.
The Pennsylvania Advisory Committee on Wrongful
Convictions296 has a similar mandate to study the "underlying causes
of wrongful convictions" and make recommendations for reform2 97
after reviewing cases.298 Similarly, the Wisconsin Criminal Justice
Study Commission has "a broad mandate to study different aspects
of the system and craft solutions to problems they identify." 299 The
Commission anticipates that it will produce "reports, conferences,
guidelines, research papers, legislation, and jury instructions." 3 00 It
has, to date, generated one report on DNA testing backlogS30' and a
position paper on the use of false confessions in criminal cases, which
makes detailed findings from other states' exonerations to reach
conclusions about the problems inherent to these confessions. 30 2
294See California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, Reports and
Recommendations, http://www.ccfaj.org/reports.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
295 See CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ON REMEDIES 11-14 (2008), http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/incompentence/officiall
REPORT%20AND%20RECOMMENDATIONS%200N%20REMEDIES.pdf.
296The advisory committee received its authority through a resolution passed by the
Pennsylvania Senate in 2006. See S. Res. 381, 190th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006). In
2007, a panel of "judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, law enforcement officers, and victims'
advocates" convened "to study the causes of erroneous convictions and make recommendations
for preventing them." Gabrielle Banks, Pennsylvania Panel to Study Wrongful Convictions,
PITTSBURGH-POST GAZETTE (Mar. 31, 2007), http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/0709077740
16-85.stm (describing the panel and citing the resolution sponsored by Senator Greenleaf); see
also Joint State Government Commission, General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Task Forces and Advisory Committees, http://jsg.legis.state.pa.us/STATUSI
.HTM (showing state task forces and advisory committees and tracking their progress).
297 See Pa. S. Res. 381.
298 1d. (directing the committee to "review cases in which an innocent person was
wrongfully convicted and subsequently exonerated, . . . identify the most common causes of
wrongful convictions, identify current laws, rules and procedures implicated in each type of
causation, and identify ... solutions in the form of legislative, rule or procedural changes or
educational opportunities for elimination of each type of causation," and to subsequently report
to the Senate with findings and recommendations, which should include "potential
implementation plans, cost implications, including possible savings, and the impact on the
criminal justice system for each potential solution").
299 Wisconsin Criminal Justice Study Commission, Charter Statement 3, http://www.wcjsc
.org/pdfs/charter.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
300 Id.
301 See Wis. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STUDY COMM'N, POSITION PAPER: "DECREASING THE
TURNAROUND TIME FOR DNA TESTING" (2007), http://www.wcjsc.orgWCJSCReport--.on
DNA Backlog.pdf.
302 WIS. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STUDY COMM'N, POSITION PAPER ON FALSE CONFESSIONS 1
(2007), http://www.wcjsc.org/Position Paper.-on-False_- Confessions.pdf. The report discusses
the case of Christopher Ochoa, convicted in Texas for rape and murder. After two twelve-hour
interrogation sessions, where detectives lied about the strength of the evidence against him (they
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Texas also formed a comprehensive study commission in 2008,
when a judge on the state's highest criminal court created the Texas
Criminal Justice Integrity Unit,30 3 an "ad hoc committee" comprised
of district attorneys, defense attorneys, judges, state representatives
and senators, crime lab directors, the director of the state's police
chief association, and judges. 304 The committee "review[s] the
strengths and weaknesses of the Texas criminal justice system," 305
hearing speakers from innocence and justice projects, police
departments, universities, and crime labs who address problems
with various evidentiary procedures. 30 It has recommended several
legislative changes, such as reforming eyewitness identification
procedures and implementing a "[t]raveling DNA [lab," which
would "act as an unannounced check on criminal labs" throughout
Texas.307
The final type of state innocence commission, the "blue ribbon
panel," is charged with the task of studying a specific wrongful
conviction issue and generating a report. Governor George Ryan of
Illinois "appointed a blue-ribbon panel to study the death penalty and
make recommendations to correct its failings."308 The Commission,
made up of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, police officers, and
even a novelist, reviewed death penalty cases and issued a report
with eighty-five specific recommendations for reforms, including
review of eyewitness identification procedures, increased funding for
defense attorneys, and intensified "scrutiny" of in-custody defendant
had none), "repeatedly told Ochoa that they knew he had murdered" the victim, and "told him
that he would face the death penalty if he did not admit to the crime." Id. Ochoa "eventually
broke down" and signed a confession. Id. More than twelve years after Ochoa had been
convicted, a serial rapist confessed to the murder and rape, and DNA testing verified Ochoa's
innocence. Id. The report, after investigating and evaluating current interrogation techniques,
concluded that existing safeguards against false confessions are ineffective and suggested
solutions, including: electronically recording all interrogations; prosecutorial consideration of
the confession's content and its fit "with the other evidence in the case"; and the need for judges
to "determine whether juries need additional [expert] assistance in evaluating the reliability of a
confession." Id. at 10, 11-12, 14.
303 See Press Release, Office of Judge Barbara Hervey, Tex. Court of Criminal
Appeals (June 3, 2008), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.orglwp-content/uploads/cca
-tcjiu-press-releasel.pdf (announcing Judge Hervey's formation of the Texas Criminal Justice
Integrity Unit).
3
msee TEX. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTEGRITY UNIT, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF
AcTIvrrIEs 1, 3 (2009), http://standdown.typepad.com/REPORT-TxCriminalJusticelntegrity
Unit-2008-Report.doc.
305 Id. at 3.
306 See id. at 3-4.
307 Id. at 7.
3 08 Findley, supra note 236, at 348-49.
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testimony.309 Because blue ribbon panels' study task can be broadly
defined to include, for example, investigation into past wrongful
convictions, the work of these panels is sometimes very similar to that
of other states' comprehensive study commissions. New York's State
Bar Association, for example, convened a "blue ribbon task force"
charged with studying the "systemic, procedural and statutory causes
that contribute to wrongful convictions and propos[ing] solutions
to this growing problem."310 In 2009, it issued its final report "for
the consideration of the House of Delegates," summarizing the
causes of wrongful convictions based on fifty-three "carefully
reviewed" case studies and providing recommendations for reform."'
The commission, like others, attributed the wrongful convictions
to six central errors: "[g]overnment [p]ractices," "[i]dentification
[p]rocedures," "[m]ishandling of [florensic [e]vidence," "[u]se of
[f]alse [c]onfessions," "[u]se of [j]ailhouse [i]nformants," and
"[d]efense [p]ractices."312
As shown by these state efforts, innocence commissions have been
conducting, for about a decade now, the very type of investigation
seen in the Cole case.313 Although they have nuanced differences, all
of them undertake several common tasks. First, they identify and
investigate new cases, or summarize cases already reviewed by other
states, which did not have the benefit of DNA when they were
originally tried and in which DNA later established innocence. They
also identify the many non-biological errors that occurred in these
cases. Based on these identified problems, they recommend that
the legislature, the police, defense attorneys, and prosecutors
amend various procedures currently followed in order to prevent
future wrongful convictions. In carrying out this work, innocence
commissions do what other institutions-courts and the legislature,
in particular-typically have not: they collect and carefully review
all of the relevant cases, glean important data on causes from those
cases, and record their findings in detailed reports. Further, the
commissions are typically composed of a diverse array of individuals,
30Id. at 349 (explaining that the commission reviewed cases from the twenty-four years
following the reimplementation of the death penalty in Illinois).
31oNew York State Bar Association, State Bar Association Creates Blue Ribbon Task
Force to Study Proliferation of Wrongful Convictions, June 4, 2008, http://www.nysba.org/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=NewsCenter&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTEN
TID=17557.
311 TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, FINAL REPORT OF
THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION'S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 8, 8-18
(2009), http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/TaskForceonWrongfulConvictions/Final
WrongfulConvictionsReport.pdf.
312 Id. at 6.
313 See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
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thus helping to ensure that recommendations represent several
perspectives.314 Innocence commissions, as bodies tasked specifically
with investigating wrongful conviction cases and making
recommendations for reform, may thus be the best institutions to
make the sort of findings that this Article argues are crucial in an
exoneration. 1 Indeed, Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld view these
commissions as the key to a more just system, arguing that
"innocence commissions can serve as a capstone reform that keeps in
place a recurring systemic examination of defects and remedies in the
criminal justice system before the current 'learning moment' brought
about by post-conviction DNA exonerations fades."31
With the exception of North Carolina, innocence cominssions in
the United States, however, do not themselves exonerate wrongfully
convicted defendants or refer such defendants to courts but instead
study exonerations resulting from other processes. And, as in any
study, a large sample size will produce more trustworthy results.
Thus, as discussed in Part lI.A, it is critical to uncover as many
wrongful convictions as possible-including cases in which the
defendant has died.317 For jurisdictions with innocence commissions
to study the raw data of wrongful convictions, determine their causes,
and suggest reforms, therefore, posthumous exonerations will be
valuable regardless of how they are conducted. As an alternative for
the many states without such a commission, however, posthumous
exonerations can-due to the nature of the parties and the case-
314 See, e.g., Pa. S. Res. 381 (requiring the Pennsylvania Advisory Committee on Wrongful
Convictions to include representation, at minimum, from prosecution, defense, law enforcement,
corrections, judiciary, and victim assistance); State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, Commission
Composition, http://www.jud.ct.gov/committees/wrongfulconviction/#COMPOSITION (last
visited Mar. 21, 2010) (explaining that the individuals appointed to Connecticut's Advisory
Commission on Wrongful Conviction "will bring to the Commission differing areas of
expertise"); see also supra text accompanying note 309 (describing the diverse composition of
Illinois's blue ribbon panel).
3 15 This Article does not argue for any particular type of innocence commission, as other
authors have. Lissa Griffin, for example, has argued for commissions similar to the one later
implemented in North Carolina, with full investigative powers and the "power to entertain
claims of factual innocence, as opposed to claims of error or misconduct." Griffin, supra note
273, at 1302. David Horan similarly has argued for an expanded form of innocence commission,
which would "investigate cases of alleged wrongful felony convictions, sua sponte or upon
application from a defendant or his representative, family, or friends, and refer convictions with
a 'real possibility' of being quashed on an appeal to the state's appellate courts." Horan, supra
note 269, at 166. Stanley Fisher proposed the establishment of "Official Commissions of
Inquiry," similar to Governor Ryan's death penalty commission in Illinois. See Fisher, supra
note 96, at 71. Keith Findley proposed an analogous "Criminal Justice Study Commission."
Findley, supra note 236, at 352-53. In contrast, this Article simply argues that some form of
extrajudicial body charged with making these exclusive findings is the best method for revealing
the causes of wrongful convictions.316 Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 216, at 100.
317 See discussion supra Part Il.A.
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produce innocence commission-type fact-finding about the causes
of wrongful convictions within the existing judicial exoneration
apparatus, and legislatures should act to make judicial posthumous
exonerations more widely possible.
IV. POSTHUMOUS EXONERATIONS AS A VEHICLE FOR FACT-FINDING
ON THE CAUSES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION
To date, detailed court findings about the causes of wrongful
convictions have occurred infrequently, but the proceedings in
the Cole case-which produced a thorough discussion of
the investigative missteps leading to Cole's conviction and
proposed reforms 31-show that in jurisdictions without innocence
commissions, courts could provide an alternative forum for
conducting these sorts of inquiries, particularly in posthumous cases.
The courts, in other words, although they may not always possess
the competence or credibility of innocence commissions, could
nonetheless potentially fill these commissions' role to some degree.
This Part argues that posthumous exonerations offer opportunities
for findings that are less likely to arise in living exonerations and that
given these unique considerations, as well as the importance of doing
justice in the individual case and adding to the number of known
wrongful convictions, legislatures should create an avenue for judicial
posthumous exoneration proceedings, as well as other opportunities
for posthumous vindication, such as executive clemency. These
proceedings could be quasi-inquisitorial, along the lines of the Cole
court of inquiry, but this is not necessary, provided that courts
(or another institution conducting exonerations) have adequate
information to make an accurate determination of innocence and,
more importantly, the power to make detailed findings.
A. The Exonerating Judge as a One-Person Innocence Commission
Posthumous exonerations, because of their scarcity, have so far
failed to create any discernible trend in the type of proceedings
relied upon or in the findings generated. Some have followed the path
of living exonerations, wherein courts simply vacate convictions.319
In one, the prosecutor simply dropped charges,320 thus, as in
living exonerations, failing to create any meaningful findings. The
318 See discussion supra Part I.B.l.
3 19 See supra text accompanying note 94 (describing courts' posthumous vacation of
charges against Frank Lee Smith).320 See supra text accompanying note 109 (explaining that the prosecution posthumously
dropped charges against Louis Greco).
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Cole, case, however, demonstrates the potential of posthumous
exonerations, and perhaps all exonerations, to generate findings about
what went wrong in a case and, accordingly, suggest reforms.
In Cole, a county district court judge, who formerly sat on the
state's highest criminal court and who is known for his willingness to
consider creative approaches,321 utilized a Texas statute allowing his
court to sit as a court of inquiry to conduct a searching investigation
of the events leading to the conviction of Timothy Cole and to
eventually exonerate him. 32 2 Having heard evidence in the form of
"documentary proof and sworn testimony," 323 including testimony
from an expert on eyewitness testimony324 put on by the petitioners'
Innocence Project counsel, the court also prepared lengthy "findings
of fact," which detailed the crime that occurred and the ensuing
investigation and trial. 2 After describing the entire prosecutorial
process in depth, as well as providing a detailed account of appellate
courts' management of the case and the real perpetrator's multiple
unheeded attempts to confess to the rape following Cole's conviction,
the court concluded by summarizing the many errors that occurred at
each stage in the process. 326 The court noted that, despite the fact that
"[n]o evidence linked Tim Cole to the crimes committed" by the
rapist, "all attention was focused on Tim Cole. There was no effort to
broaden or expand the investigation. Even worse, the police
deliberately ignored facts that got in the way of their theory." 3 27 The
court also observed that a Special Fields Bureau Chief from a county
district attorney's office, who "testified to the [c]ourt as an expert on
the causes and consequences of wrongful convictions in Texas,"
explained at the hearing that this type of "tunnel vision ... played a
contributing role in many of the wrongful convictions analyzed by his
office."3 28 The court determined that the "photographic line-up put
together by the police was clearly suggestive."329 It noted that,
according to expert testimony, when the officer who is involved in the
investigation and who knows which potential defendant he or she
prefers to have picked also conducts the photo lineup, this "increases
321 See, e.g., Program for Offenders That Just Might Work, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Aug. 15, 2008, at A12 (explaining the history of Charlie Baird's career as a judge and
describing his "inclination to keep all but the most incorrigible defendants out of prison").
322 See Cole Decision, supra note 5, at 1.
323 Id.
324 See id. at 9-10.
325 See id. at 2-10.
32 6 See id. at 2-13.
32 7 Id. at 10.




the danger that verbal and physical cues will be given to the witness
as to who to pick." 33 0 Further, the victim was "never told that the
suspect may or may not have been in the photo spread . . . or that
the investigation of the case would continue regardless of her
identification." 33 1 The court again referred back to the expert
testimony from the hearing, which demonstrated that the "failure to
make [these sorts of admonishments] here contributed to the
misidentification made by [the victim]."332
After identifying the errors leading to the wrongful conviction, the
court set out a distinct portion of the opinion entitled, "To the Texas
Legislature" 333 and proceeded to list concrete suggestions for changes
to the law, including better eyewitness identification procedures, such
as requiring the provision of specific written admonishments to the
witness before the witness is shown a lineup and array.334 The court
also concluded:
Laws should be enacted to provide judicial review to
prisoners claiming innocence. Technical hurdles should be
removed in such cases, especially where there is a solid
claim based on newly discovered or established scientific
evidence.335
In issuing the exoneration and, at the same time, making these
detailed findings and suggestions for reform, a Texas district court
created a document that, in content and form, looked remarkably
similar to findings made by innocence commissions. This is perhaps
not surprising, as Professor Scheck, who has called for such detailed
findings, 3 36 appeared on behalf of Cole's family.3 37
Other posthumous exonerations could follow this pattern, whether
judges are moved to conduct this sort of inquiry themselves or,
perhaps more likely, to be sympathetic to counsel's attempts to turn
the proceeding in this direction. This is, in part, because without a live
prisoner to be freed, the public's interest in ensuring the proper
function of the criminal justice system becomes more prominent338
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Id. at 12.
33 3 Id. at 13.
3 See id. at 14. Innocence commissions have suggested similar reforms. See, e.g., CCFAJ,
EYE WITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES, supra note 290, at 5-6.
335 Cole Decision, supra note 5, at 14.
33 6 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
337 See Cole Decision, supra note 5, at 1.
331 This is not a normative claim that society should prioritize the investigation of
procedural errors in posthumous wrongful conviction cases over those involving live
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[W]hen third parties, like the media or a public interest group,
seek access to the evidence-not in the name of the executed,
but in the name of the public generally-the principles of
finality are not implicated. Such third-party suits are brought
to further the public's right to assess the functioning of
government institutions.33 9
Another important consideration is the family's desire to turn their
relative's ordeal into something meaningful. As Cole's brother
explained, "all those things that we've experienced, we don't want for
anyone else.. . . If [Tim's] death accomplishes that, then his life was
not in vain. That's basically our ultimate desire." 3" Judges, moved by
similar feelings, might be more willing to entertain attempts by
innocence groups like the Innocence Project to obtain these sorts of
findings.
Although any exoneration could potentially provide a similar
forum, when the defendant is still a part of the proceeding, it is more
likely that the only question addressed closely by the court will be
whether or not the defendant is innocent and should be released from
prison. As discussed in Part Ill, in live exonerations it is common for
the state to get rid of the case by agreeing to vacate the conviction or
to drop the charges, at which point a busy judge, and the newly freed
prisoner, may be less inclined to conduct any further investigation.34 1
Further, although parties will not always request such fact-finding,
the types of parties bringing claims in posthumous cases-often
innocence groups, the media, and religious groups,342 all of
whom seek broader criminal justice reforms in addition to an
individual remedy for the deceased defendant's family-suggest that
fact-finding will be frequently and, perhaps in light of the Innocence
Project's success in Cole, increasingly requested. Legislative action to
create new posthumous exoneration procedures will likely be
necessary, however, to realize this potential. This action will be
required both to open the door to court for aggrieved parties seeking
posthumous vindication for an individual defendant and to ensure that
judges have the power to make findings when the parties so request.
defendants. It is rather an observation that the parties and courts are likely more willing in
posthumous cases to look to the procedural errors because the focus on the physical release of
the defendant is absent.
3 3 9 Moyes, supra note 226, at 995-96.
MBlackburn, supra note 131 (internal quotation marks omitted).
341 See supra notes 255-68 and accompanying text.
342 See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
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B. Making Posthumous Exoneration Possible
Given the importance of posthumous exonerations, legislatures
should expand the jurisdictional and procedural bases for
these proceedings, 34 3 particularly in jurisdictions where innocence
commissions have not been, and perhaps will not be, created.
Few legal avenues to posthumous exoneration currently exist. The
dearth of formal, standardized procedures for posthumously
examining cases was most recently highlighted in Texas, in a case
that may have national implications. In 1991, a fire killed several
children in Texas. Todd Willingham, the father of the children,
explained that he had attempted to run into the burning building to try
to save them.3 44 A jailhouse snitch later implicated Willingham,345
leading to his conviction and execution in 2004.346 In the time
between his arrest and execution, Willingham emphatically and
consistently asserted his innocence.347 In August 2009, a fire science
expert, in a report produced at the request of the Texas Forensic
Science Commission, concluded that there was no evidence linking
Cameron Todd Willingham to the fatal 1991 fire for which he was
executed.348 Nine other nationally known fire scientists have also
looked at the case and reached similar conclusions.349
The Commission, after receiving the fire scientists' report,
announced plans to scrutinize the report and draw its own
conclusions. 3 50 The fire scientists' report, combined with the
Commission's conclusions, could potentially produce valuable
findings highlighting the grave forensic, testimonial, and other errors
that may have led to the wrongful conviction of a man for a fire that
he did not set. They could also be the foundational documents for the
first posthumous exoneration of an executed defendant if Texas
ultimately concedes that Willingham was indeed innocent. Two days
before the Commission was to hold a hearing with testimony from an
arson expert who believed that the testimony in the Willingham case
was false and unjustified, however, Texas Governor Rick Perry
replaced the presiding officer of the Commission with a conservative,
"tough-on-crime chief prosecutor 35 ' and also replaced two other
3 Adequate opportunity for DNA testing, of course, will also be necessary.
31 David Grann, Trial by Fire, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 42.
5 Id. at 47.
6 Id. at 48, 57.
Steve Mills, Report Questions if Fire was Arson, CHI. TRI., Aug. 25, 2009, § 1, at 11.
34 Id.
350 d.
351 Chuck Lindell & Jason Embry, Perry Shakes Up Agency Investigating Man's
7392010]1
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Commission members.35 2 The newly appointed presiding officer
promptly canceled the hearing.353 While the ultimate outcome of the
inquiry remains uncertain, the ad hoc and politically charged nature of
the process used to review the Willingham case, along with the
jurisdictional liberties that had to be taken in Cole to reach the
question of innocence,35 4 demonstrate the inadequacy of the currently
available avenues for posthumous exoneration.
Where innocence commissions do not exist, courts55 could use
their discretion in living exoneration cases to make detailed findings,
but they traditionally have not. Thus, current opportunities for the
type of exoneration and findings that occurred in Cole are limited. At
least twenty states that provide for a new trial based on the discovery
of new evidence require filing within a period ranging from sixty days
to three years after the date of the original judgment,3 56 thus limiting
many posthumous (and living) actual innocence claims that rely
on DNA evidence.3 57 Further, the statutes that provide for
post-conviction DNA testing do not typically include a specific
procedure for exoneration once testing occurs. 58 And many of these
statutes expressly apply only to defendants still in prison or custody,
thus barring any chance at posthumous exoneration.3 5 9 Even where
courts have found ways to grant posthumous exonerations, their
jurisdictional grounds appear somewhat tenuous. In the Cole case, for
Execution, AuSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Oct. 1, 2009, http://www.statesman.com/news/content/
region/legislature/stories/2009/10/01/100lforensic.html.
352 James C. McKinley, Jr., Texas Governor Defends Shakeup of Commission, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2009, at A16.
353 Id.
354See Cole Decision, supra note 5, at 1-2 (identifying the provisions of the Texas
Constitution and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure that, according to the judge convening the
court of inquiry, provided the court with jurisdiction).
355 Legislatures could also expand the ability of non-judicial institutions, such as pardon
boards, to conduct posthumous proceedings. In light of the argument above that each new
confirmed wrongful conviction adds an important data point to the set-even if that data point
does not come with detailed findings-enabling posthumous exoneration in any form would be
worthwhile. As will be discussed, however, courts are the best option for making findings where
innocence commissions are not in place.
3 56 See Medwed, Up the River, supra note 18, at 676-77 (summarizing the statutes).
357 See Cynthia E. Jones, Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The Preservation of
Biological Evidence Under Innocence Protection Statutes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1250
(2005) (observing that "most post-conviction litigation based on DNA testing is initiated many
years after the original conviction (usually because DNA technology was not available at the
time of trial)").
351 See Garrett, Innocence, supra note 10, at 1683 (explaining that many states grant the
trial judge "discretion in deciding whether to grant relief based on post-conviction DNA
testing").
35 9 See id. at 1680 (observing that "twenty-one jurisdictions require that the petitioner be
incarcerated or in custody in order to obtain testing").
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example, the court utilized a proceeding typically reserved for grand
jury-type investigations into state officials' misconduct 360 in order to
address the deceased defendant's case. Thus, there is a need to ensure,
through legislatively created causes of action, that courts have clear
jurisdiction over posthumous cases.
These processes need not take the form of a quasi-inquisitorial
proceeding such as that in Cole. One approach would be to modify
the currently limited avenues to courts offered by the post-conviction
DNA testing statutes and statutes that provide for new trials based on
newly discovered evidence. Some scholars have already argued for an
expansion of these statutes to accommodate more exonerations of
living defendants, suggesting that statutes of limitations in new
evidence statutes should be stricken or greatly lengthened, for
example,36 1 and that, more generally, the standard for granting relief
based on new evidence of innocence should be loosened.36 2
Additional reforms, however, would be necessary to ensure that
posthumous exonerations could occur through these existing avenues.
In addition to lengthening statutes of limitations for new evidence
claims, legislatures would have to remove the common requirement
that an individual must be in prison or on probation in order to gain
363
access to DNA testing.
A second, and perhaps preferable, means of ensuring that courts
may consider posthumous exoneration claims is for the legislature to
create a new cause of action. Some political leaders have already
attempted this sort of reform. Governor Ryan of Illinois, for example,
proposed to "create a law to ensure that claims of 'actual innocence'
(as opposed to technical legal issues) are heard," 3 64 although this law
would not have specifically addressed posthumous exonerations.
Additionally, in 2009, the Texas Legislature proposed a more
comprehensive solution, considering a new proceeding that would
have created a " rocess to exonerate and compensate convicts after
they have died."3 5
36See, e.g., In re Johnson, No. 07-04-0568-CV, 2004 WL 2937304, at *1 (Tex. App. Dec.
20, 2004) (requesting a court of inquiry based on allegations of abuse by prison officials); In re
Court of Inquiry, 148 S.W.3d 554, 555 (Tex. App. 2004) (addressing a court of inquiry's
conclusions regarding allegations of sexual assault perpetrated by two police officers).
361 See, e.g., Medwed, Up the River, supra note 18, at 678.
36 2 See Griffin, supra note 273, at 1305.
363 See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
36 Horan, supra note 269, at 119.
365 Elliott Blackburn, Bill Co-Authored by Duncan Would Establish Exoneration Process,
AVALANCHE-JOURNAL, Mar. 17, 2009, http://www.lubbockonline.com/stories/031709/loc_410
643159.shtml.
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Scholars have also argued for these types of reforms. For
exonerations of both deceased and living defendants, Stanley Fisher,
in his thorough study of wrongful convictions in Massachusetts,
suggests that Massachusetts should implement an Innocence
Protection Act (as the majority of states already have done). The Act
would define "the conditions and procedures under which prisoners
may obtain post-conviction access to evidence for testing purposes,"
as well as the "standards for relief." 36 6 Anne-Marie Moyes has
alternatively argued that "a provision that mandates post-execution
access to DNA evidence should be added to states' freedom of
information acts."367 This, however, does not provide a specific forum
within which posthumous exoneration may then occur.
No matter the exact legislatively enabled avenue to courts that is
chosen, given the importance of gathering data from the limited
number of pre-DNA wrongful conviction cases that exist, there must
be assurance that all potentially meritorious innocence claims,
including those involving deceased defendants, may be brought.
Several parameters will be necessary, of course, to ensure that only
these potentially meritorious and valid claims are heard. In light
of the evidentiary difficulty of conclusively establishing actual
innocence after the death of the defendant and the need to limit
further burdens on the court system, legislatively created exoneration
procedures should require, as many DNA-testing statutes already
do, 36 8 that a petitioner make a prima facie showing of "materiality" 369
or a likelihood of factual innocence. For exoneration cases, this would
likely require introduction of a DNA test or similarly conclusive
evidence. Further, cost-shifting measures should be implemented to
provide monetary relief to the parties who successfully prove a
defendant's innocence in an exoneration proceeding and to ensure
that the state does not bear these costs if the claim fails.370
Legislatures, by creating a new cause of action for posthumous
exonerations-with sufficient constraints to ensure that the courts are
366 Fisher, supra note 96, at 70-71.
3 67 Moyes, supra note 226, at 997.
368See, e.g., Garrett, Innocence, supra note 10, at 1682 (discussing various state
requirements for exoneration relief once DNA testing has occurred, such as New York's
"reasonable probability of innocence" and Pennsylvania's "more-probable-than-not" standard
(citing N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 440.30 (McKinney 2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543
(West 2007)).
369 See, e.g., id. at 1676 (observing that eighty-four percent of jurisdictions require a
showing of "materiality" for a defendant to gain access to DNA testing, meaning that "a
reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not have been convicted if exculpatory
results had been obtained through DNA testing" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
370 At least one state DNA-testing statute has a similar provision. See id. at 1708 n.384
(citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(g) (LexisNexis 2007)).
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not flooded with frivolous innocence claims years after defendants'
deaths--can help to ensure that as many wrongful convictions as
possible are discovered. They should also ensure that, where
innocence commissions are not available to make findings on
the causes of wrongful convictions in posthumous exonerations,
courts will be able to fill in the gap. Legislatively enabled
posthumous exoneration proceedings must therefore provide adequate
opportunities for the institution conducting the inquiry to identify the
information that will lead to these findings, if the parties so request.
One possible model, and one that would seem to guarantee these
types of findings, is a quasi-inquisitorial proceeding similar to the
court of inquiry employed in the Cole case.3 71 Texas is the only state
that provides for this sort of proceeding,372 and the court of inquiry
does not appear, in intent or form, to fit posthumous exoneration
cases like Cole. Rather, it offers a type of modified grand jury
proceeding, allowing citizens, for example, to demand investigations
into potential misconduct by governing officials.373 The type of
investigation permitted by a court of inquiry, however, if modified by
a legislature to include wrongful conviction claims, would allow
courts to conduct a detailed analysis of systemic errors in the
investigation and prosecution of a case.
Once a Texas court of inquiry is convened, the district or county
attorney in the jurisdiction of the court of inquiry must assist the
judge who has convened the court, helping him or her examine the
case through the use of live evidence and witnesses.374 The judge
371 See generally Cole Decision, supra note 5.
372 See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1635 n.188 (2005).
373 Timothy Cole's case is one of the few courts of inquiry convened under this provision
in recent history. In another request for a court of inquiry, the court refused to act upon an
inmate's allegations that prison officials "committed the criminal offenses of official oppression
. . . and tampering with governmental records" after the inmate lost one year of accrued good
time credit. See In re Johnson, No. 07-04-0568-CV, 2004 WL 2937304, at *1 (Tex. App. Dec.
20, 2004). Another court rejected a request for a court of inquiry involving criminal trespass
charges for want of jurisdiction because the claimant filed in a Texas appellate court, and the
court found that "courts of inquiry are to be conducted by district judges, not appellate court
judges and no final, appealable judgment or order has been entered in the trial court." Davis v.
State, No. 2-04-462-CR, 2004 WL 2624252, at *1, (Tex. App. Nov. 18, 2004) (footnote
omitted). In another case, an individual who alleged that two police officers had sexually
assaulted her persuaded a district court to convene a court of inquiry in 2004, but the court
found "no probable cause to issue arrest warrants" for the officers. In re Court of Inquiry, 148
S.W.3d 554, 555 (Tex. App. 2004). The woman attempted to appeal this determination and the
appellate court, noting the "absence of statutory authorization for an appeal from the
magistrate's determination made in connection with the court of inquiry," held that she had no
right of appeal. Id. at 556.
374 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 52.01(c) (Vernon 2009). If the Court of Inquiry is
convened to address the district or county attorney's activities, an attorney pro tem shall assist
instead. Id. art. 52.01(d).
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conducting the court of inquiry "may allow the introduction of any
documentary or real evidence which he deems reliable."3 7 5 The judge
may also issue subpoenas,37 6 but "[a]ll witnesses testifying in any
[c]ourt of [i]nquiry have the same rights as to testifying as do
defendants in felony prosecutions in [Texas]." 377 "A person may be
compelled to give testimony or produce evidence when legally called
upon to do so" in the Court, even if the testimony would incriminate
him or her. The law provides, however, that the witness "shall not
be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for . . . any
transaction, matter or thing" relating to that testimony or evidence. 379
This proceeding grants broad investigative powers to the judge and
is quasi-inquisitorial, in that it relies upon the judge and an individual
assisting the judge to gather information deemed relevant and
evaluate that information based on an independent review, rather than
being presented with the arguments of competing counsel. Its loose
evidentiary standard permits a sweeping inquiry into a case and, if
adopted and expanded by a state legislature, would allow for the very
type of detailed investigation that could produce the necessary
detailed findings in exonerations. Further, there is no provision for
appeal from the court of inquiry,380 thus making it the true "court of
last resort" and avoiding endless legal challenges.
Some scholars would likely embrace this type of inquisitorial
process. Despite the long-held notion that the American judicial
system is adversarial to its core-and that it should be-scholars have
persuasively argued that "inquisitorial procedure is neither alien to
our traditions nor inherently unfair" and that America's "legal system
only became fully 'adversarial' in the relatively recent past." 38 1
Further, despite its current formal rejection of inquisitorial
procedures, the system-whether purposefully or out of necessity-
employs alternatives to fully adversarial procedures in both criminal
cases (through plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion, for
example 3 82) and civil matters, as evidenced by the use of special
masters.383 Indeed, it is not uncommon for special masters within the
3 75 Id. art. 52.02.
3 76 Id. art. 52.03.
371 Id. art. 52.04(a).
378 Id. art. 52.05.
379 Id.
aSosee TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 52.01(a) (Vernon 2006) (allowing a judge to
convene a court of inquiry but not providing for an appeal from this unique proceeding).
381 Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and
the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1183-84 (2005).
382 See id.at 1188-89.
3 83 See id. at 1191-92.
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judicial system to actively manage the pretrial discovery process or
implement a consent decree post-trial, "a task which may require
them to undertake their own investigations, often on an ex parte
basis,"384 and state courts have used special masters to investigate the
causes of wrongful conviction in habeas cases.385
Whether described as "quasi-inquisitorial" or as a modified
version of the adversarial process, such as Abram Chayes's "diffused
adversarial system," 386 there is a legitimate view that American courts
are, like it or not, moving toward a model where judges have
substantial control over cases. This suggests that conducting a
posthumous exoneration through a court of inquiry or similar
quasi-inquisitorial proceeding may be a natural extension of an
increasingly common procedure. In arguing that the private law
model of bipolar private disputes has evolved to a public law system,
for example, Chayes suggests that this system is a "new model of
judicial action and the judicial role, both of which depart sharply from
received conceptions."3 87 This model, which Chayes describes as a
"diffused adversarial structure,"388 represents a system wherein "[t]he
judge is . . . active, with responsibility ... for organizing and shaping
the litigation to ensure a just and viable outcome"; "[t]he party
structure is not rigidly bilateral but sprawling and amorphous";
and "[t]he subject matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between
private individuals about private rights, but a grievance about the
operation of public policy."3 89 John Langbein also describes "growing
manifestations of judicial control of fact-gathering in certain strands
of federal procedure" in America and observes that "these techniques
have been seeping into the conduct of ordinary litigation."390
Providing perhaps an additional justification for a
quasi-inquisitorial court proceeding, Owen Fiss has argued that
"[t]he function of adjudication, whether in the nineteenth century or
twentieth century, torts or criminal law, contract or antitrust, ... has
not been to resolve disputes between individuals, but rather to give
meaning to our public values."39' If this is so, given the strong public
384Id. at 1194.385 See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CAL. L. REV. 383, 435
(2007).38 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1281, 1308 (1976).387 Id. at 1288-90.
388 Id. at 1308.
389 Id. at 1302.
39DIohn H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823,
825 (1985).
31 Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 36 (1979).
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values of avoiding convictions of innocent defendants, it makes
ample sense to provide a court proceeding within which posthumous
exonerations may occur-particularly exonerations after a
defendant's death, where public values, and not a release from prison,
dominate the debate.
Judges in a quasi-inquisitorial posthumous exoneration might also
have unique advantages in collecting information and identifying the
issues, which is important for developing findings about the causes of
wrongful conviction. Chayes, in arguing that America's legal system
increasingly operates under a public law model with more judicial
involvement in cases,392 suggests that there are good reasons for this
model, arguing:
[T]he judiciary may have some important institutional
advantages for the tasks it is assuming ....
... [T]he court, although traditionally thought less
competent than legislatures or administrative agencies in
gathering and assessing information, may have unsuspected
advantages in this regard. Even the diffused adversarial
structure of public law litigation furnishes strong incentives
for the parties to produce information. If the party structure
is sufficiently representative of the interests at stake,
a considerable range of relevant information will be
forthcoming. And, because of the limited scope of the
proceeding, the information required can be effectively
focused and specified. Information produced will not only be
subject to adversary review, but as we have seen, the judge
can engage his own experts to assist in evaluating the
evidence. Moreover, the information that is produced will not
be filtered through the rigid structures and preconceptions of
bureaucracies.393
Langbein similarly argues that judicial fact-finding promotes
judicial economy and creates more relevant facts.3 94 He urges that
unlike in the adversarial system, where the two "cases" (formed by
each side presenting a different version of the case) "function as
traffic rules for the partisan presentation of evidence to a passive and
ignorant trier," 3 95 "[t]he [inquisitorial] judge who gathers the facts
39See Chayes, supra note 386, at 1302.
3 Id. at 1307-08 (footnote omitted).




soon knows the case as well as the litigants do, and he concentrates
each subsequent increment of fact-gathering on the most important
issues still unresolved." 39 6
On the other hand, there are familiar and reasonable arguments for
continuing to strive for an adversarial tradition even in posthumous
proceedings where the defendant is absent,397 and attempts by a
legislature to employ a quasi-inquisitorial proceeding for posthumous
exonerations would likely invoke these arguments. Adversaries
identify those facts for which there is sufficient evidence and
exchange written pleadings and stipulations, thus narrowing the
issues.398 In a posthumous exoneration, given the long history of the
case and the potentially endless stream of evidence that accompanies
it, pre-trial stipulations may be particularly important. Further,
adversaries provide strong and individually prepared opposing
arguments, thus preventing the judge, who is supposed to be a
neutral arbiter, from having to make arguments for each side and
entering bias-creating territory. 399 Even innocence commissions,
adversarialists might argue, offer more potential for the introduction
of opposing viewpoints and the avoidance of bias than would
inquisitorial courts, since the commission purposefully appoints a
diverse group of people to serve on the investigative panel.4W
Reasoned opposition may be especially valuable in posthumous
exoneration proceedings, where justifiable outrage over the plight of
the deceased defendant could make judges too quick to condemn the
processes that led to the wrongful conviction.
3961d. at 831-32. One non-trivial problem with the court of inquiry and similar
quasi-inquisitorial processes that could be followed for posthumous exonerations, however,
arises from the relatively loose procedures that they employ. Although the traditional
constitutional and procedural protections that apply in criminal proceedings will not be
implicated as heavily in posthumous cases, as the defendant will not be present, all exoneration
proceedings will still require baseline guarantees of due process and other procedural
protections. Courts' refusal to grant a posthumous exception to the attorney-client
communications privilege, for example, shows that there are legitimate ongoing concerns with a
defendant's privacy-and the incentives of evidentiary rules during a defendant's life-which
cannot be ignored posthumously.
397 Lynn Splitek, in contrast, argues that posthumous proceedings cannot, by their nature,
be adversarial, and that this illegitimates the proceeding: "[Tihe public's interest in a final
determination is served only when the final judgment is the product of a thoughtful, fully
adversarial process. After the defendant's death, release of the defendant is no longer at stake
and punishment is no longer a concern." Lynn Johnston Splitek, Note, State v. McDonald:
Death of a Criminal Defendant Pending Appeal in Wisconsin-The Appeal Survives, 1989 Wis.
L. REv. 811, 833.
398 See Lon L. Fuller, Essay, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353, 383-84 (1978).399 See Fuller, supra note 398, at 382-83.
4w See supra notes 304, 309 and accompanying text.
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Practically speaking, there would also be zealous adversaries to
collect the evidence and present the legal arguments in an adversarial
posthumous proceeding. Innocence groups like the Innocence Project
are devoted to identifying and pursuing meritorious innocence claims.
Prosecutors, in turn, are repeat players in the criminal justice system
and have a strong interest in defending the processes used to obtain
convictions, and they may well wish to participate, thereby making an
401adversarial proceeding a potentially viable option. Prosecutors
frequently oppose DNA testing even after defendants have died,402
demonstrating a continued interest in validating their previous work.
Moreover, they are accustomed to defending investigative and
prosecutorial procedures in the habeas context. In the face of DNA
evidence or similarly strong evidence of the defendant's innocence,
however, and in light of limited prosecutorial resources and the
absence of a prisoner to be set free, many prosecutors may not wish to
participate in some or all posthumous exonerations proceedings, even
if allowed by statute. This suggests that the quasi-inquisitorial model
could be common in practice if not in name.
This Article will not resolve the deep-rooted question of whether
quasi-inquisitorial processes produce unbiased decisions based on the
best available information. That determination must be left to the
larger, ongoing debate around the value of competing court structures.
Ultimately, either an adversarial or inquisitorial model could be an
effective means of generating meaningful findings in posthumous
cases. The most important aspect of any proceeding enabled by a
legislature will be an assurance that the judge has the ability-and
preferably the duty-to bring to light the causes of the wrongful
conviction.
CONCLUSION
The recent focus on innocence has produced hundreds of
exonerations. Although these exonerations have begun to reveal the
causes of wrongful convictions and have inspired needed reforms to
40 See, e.g., Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 23, at 475 ("Prosecutors may approach
claims of innocence with great skepticism and resist them strenuously on the theory that the
principles of finality underlying the legal impediments to post-conviction relief should similarly
influence prosecutors' own attitude toward post-trial innocence claims."); Daniel S. Medwed,
The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 125, 136 (2004) [hereinafter Medwed, Zeal Deal] (observing that "upon achieving a
conviction, both the individual prosecutor and the office may become vested in maintaining the
integrity of the conviction").
4WSee Medwed, Zeal Deal, supra note 401, at 129 ("Empirical proof suggests that
prosecutors have consented to DNA tests in less than fifty percent of the cases in which testing
later exonerated the inmate.").
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the criminal justice system, much work remains to be done. An
infrequently recognized facet of this movement is the posthumous
exoneration. This phenomenon, as yet rare, demonstrates an
increasing recognition that even where justice comes too late for the
individual defendant, the act of exonerating the wrongfully convicted
has benefits that extend far beyond the individual. These frequently
intangible, but nonetheless considerable, benefits flow to the
defendant's family, the victim, and the larger community. As this
Article has argued, the value of posthumous exonerations greatly
outweighs the need for finality, a conclusion bolstered, perhaps
surprisingly, by the rationale underlying the abatement doctrine,
which closes criminal cases upon the defendant's death.
Posthumous exonerations are distinctly valuable, from a systemic
perspective, for two reasons. In addition to ensuring that more
wrongful convictions from within the small DNA window are
uncovered and allowing us to separate out and positively identify the
errors that lead to wrongful convictions, they also provide an example
of how courts can make meaningful findings about these errors.
Indeed, because the physical release of the defendant is no longer at
issue, posthumous exonerations are prime opportunities for courts to
make a broader inquiry into the causes of wrongful conviction. Of
course, posthumous exonerations likely should not take precedence
over the living: the cases of those innocent defendants still serving
time in prison for crimes that they did not commit should be heard
as soon as possible. Further, where innocence commissions are
available, they are the most competent institution to make such
findings. But legislatures should provide an avenue to posthumous
exonerations in courts in order to produce case studies for innocence
commissions (which do not themselves exonerate individuals), to
generate findings in the many states where innocence commissions do
not exist, and to provide belated justice to families, victims, and
communities.
Identifying wrongful convictions and rooting out their causes does
not come close to offering a comprehensive solution for the
challenges facing today's criminal justice system. The term "wrongful
conviction" itself is, perhaps, artificially limited, as it excludes
many convictions that are highly problematic but not technically
"erroneous-such as, for example, those obtained by guilty pleas
coerced by over-charging."a Elevated attention to "glamorous"
403 See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 3, at 14 (arguing that the "'zone of perceived injustice.'
encompassed within the term "wrongful conviction" should be expanded (quoting Craig Haney,
Exoneration and Wrongful Condemnations: Expanding the Zone of Perceived Injustice in Death
Penalty Cases, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 131, 142 (2006))).
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innocence claims may distract resources from the many other
problems in the system that need attention, such as disproportionate
punishment. 4" As Susan Bandes argues in the capital punishment
context, "Given the enormous amount of work left to be done in
reforming the criminal justice system . . . it would be dispiriting to
think that the movement drew all its power from revulsion at the
execution of those able to prove they were blameless."4 5
Nonetheless, wrongful convictions proven through DNA, although
not a "panacea,'" tell a powerful story, and can be the basis of
important reform if properly conducted. A single exoneration in the
form of a one-line vacation of a judgment or a curtly phrased
clemency order does little for the system; an exoneration with
detailed findings does much more. With the strong grounding of a
scientifically proven error, one can, with attention and expertise, start
from the certainty of innocence and seek the causes of a wrongful
conviction, whether those arise from procedural missteps, entrenched
police and prosecutorial culture,4 07 or inadequate counsel. Better live
and posthumous exonerations can teach us lessons that must not be
lost: long after today's innocent defendants are dead, their ordeals can
help others avoid the same fate.
4 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a Wall? The
Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More
Broadly, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 156-57 (2008).
4 5 Bandes, supra note 3, at 7-8.
406ld. at 16.
40See, e.g., id. at 21 (discussing "incentive structures deeply imbedded in police culture,
prosecutors' offices, and other agencies").
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